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The validity of existing empirical tests of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH) is constantly under
scrutiny due to two shortcomings. First, the issues of unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error
in environmental regulation are typically ignored due to the lack of a credible, traditional instrumental
variable. Second, while the recent literature has emphasized the importance of geographic spillovers in
determining the location choice of foreign investment, such spatial e￿ects have yet to be adequately in-
corporated into empirical tests of the PHH. As a result, the impact of environmental regulations on trade
patterns and the location decisions of multinational enterprises remains unclear. In this paper, we cir-
cumvent the lack of a traditional instrument within a model incorporating geographic spillovers utilizing
three novel identi￿cation strategies. Using state-level panel data on inbound U.S. FDI, relative abatement
costs, and other determinants of FDI, we consistently ￿nd (i) evidence of environmental regulation being
endogenous, (ii) a negative impact of own environmental regulation on inbound FDI in pollution-intensive
sectors, particularly when measured by employment, and (iii) larger e￿ects of environmental regulation
once endogeneity is addressed. Neighboring environmental regulation is not found to be an important
determinant of FDI.
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The precise relationship between environmental policy, the location of production, and subsequent trade
￿ows remains an open and hot-button issue. Of particular concern is the so-called Pollution Haven Hy-
pothesis (PHH), whereby a reduction in trade barriers enables polluting multinational enterprises (MNEs)
to outsource (at least some) production activities to areas with less stringent environmental regulation,
thereby altering both the spatial distribution of economic activity and subsequent trade patterns through
the creation of havens for polluting ￿rms. Kellenberg (2009, p. 242) states that \the empirical valid-
ity of pollution haven e￿ects continues to be one of the most contentious issues in the debate regarding
international trade, foreign investment, and the environment." Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004, p. 6)
characterize the debate as \particularly heated."
Proper examination of this relationship is crucial for several reasons. First, understanding determinants
of trade patterns and the spatial distribution of MNE activity is imperative in the current economic climate.
In particular, given the dramatic rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to trade volumes over the
past two decades, understanding the behavior of MNEs is critical. For example, global FDI in￿ows rose
from less than $600 billion in 2003 to roughly $2.1 trillion in 2007 in nominal terms (UNCTAD 2010).
Aggregate inbound FDI stocks rose from $2.1 trillion in 1990 to nearly $18 trillion in 2009 in nominal
terms (UNCTAD 2010). Moreover, the U.S. is the largest recipient of global FDI ￿ows, receiving $316
billion in FDI in￿ows in 2008, roughly $100 billion more than the next two largest hosts combined (Belgium
and China).
Second, if countries are able to attract (or deter) FDI by manipulating environmental regulations,
then international coordination may be necessary to avoid Pareto-ine￿cient levels of regulation due to
transboundary pollutions or other spillovers (e.g., Levinson 1997, 2003). Third, if countries are able to
in￿uence the location of MNE activity and ultimately trade patterns through environmental regulation,
then bringing environmental policies under the purview of trade agreements may be necessary to realize
the intended e￿ects of such agreements. Fourth, and related to this prior point, existing institutional
structures such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) may be used to impede countries from choosing
their desired environmental policies if such policies can be shown to impact trade ￿ows between members.
Finally, a detailed analysis of the PHH has broader implications for the general study of capital competition
(e.g., Wilson 1999).
Despite the high stakes, the existing literature has been unable to convincingly assess the empirical
validity of the PHH for three reasons. First, environmental regulation is complex and multidimensional,
making any empirical measure fraught with measurement error. Shadbegian and Wolverton (2010, p. 13)
1state: \Measuring the level of environmental stringency in any meaningful way is quite di￿cult, whether at
the national, state, or local level." The di￿culty arises from the fact that di￿erent regulations typically cover
di￿erent pollutants, regulations may exist at multiple levels (e.g., federal and local), and monitoring and
enforcement are imperfect. Along these lines, Levinson (2008, p. 1) states: \The problem is not merely
one of collecting the appropriate data; merely conceiving of data that would represent [environmental
stringency] is di￿cult." Xing and Kolstad (2002, p. 3) refer to the measurement of environmental regulation
as \no easy task" due to its \complexity." Moreover, depending on the empirical measure employed, the
measurement error need not be classical and any bias may be accentuated by the reliance on ￿xed e￿ects
methods in the recent literature.
Second, even if an accurate measure of environmental regulation is available, it may be endogenous for
other reasons (e.g., Levinson 2008; Levinson and Taylor 2008). For example, it may be correlated with
unobserved determinants of location choice such as tax breaks or other ￿rm-speci￿c treatments, the pro-
vision of other public goods in addition to environmental quality (e.g., infrastructure), agglomeration, the
stringency of other regulations such as occupational safety standards, corruption, local political activism,
political institutions, etc. (see Arauzo-Carod et al. (2010) for a review). In addition, reverse causation may
be an issue. For instance, anticipation of low FDI in￿ows may drive reductions in environmental stringency.
Or, an increase in FDI may increase the e￿cacy of industrial lobby groups (e.g., Cole et al. 2006; Cole
and Fredriksson 2009). Conversely, as Keller and Levinson (2002, p. 695) state: \Those states that do
not attract a lot of polluting manufacturing probably do not enact stringent regulations { there simply is
less need to worry about industrial pollution in states with less industrial activity, and those states that
do attract polluting manufacturing may respond by enacting more stringent regulation." Levinson (2010,
p. 63) summarizes these arguments succinctly: \International trade has environmental consequences, and
environmental policy can have international trade consequences."
Third, existing studies of the PHH inadequately incorporate geographic spillovers. Recent theoretical
models emphasize that the extent of MNE activity in one location depends not just on attributes of that
location, but also on the attributes of other potential hosts. Moreover, the predicted direction of the cross-
e￿ects is not always in the opposite direction of the own-e￿ects, a restriction that is implicit in discrete
choice models (e.g., Yeaple 2003; Ekholm et al. 2003; Grossman et al. 2003; Baltagi et al. 2007, 2008;
Blonigen et al. 2007, 2008; Arauzo-Carod et al. 2010). Failure to account for geographic spillovers in
empirical analyses of PHH may lead to biased inference. This may be particularly problematic in the
context of empirical analyses of inbound U.S. FDI since state-level environmental regulations have been
shown to be strongly related to the regulatory stringency of neighboring states (Fredriksson and Millimet
2002).
2While these shortcomings, particularly the ￿rst and second, are well known, convincing solutions have
proven elusive due to the di￿culty of ￿nding valid exclusion restrictions. In this paper, we simultaneously
address these three shortcomings while examining the spatial distribution of inbound U.S. manufacturing
FDI across the 48 contiguous states. Geographic spillovers are incorporated in an unrestricted manner by
including a spatially lagged counterpart for each state-level attribute. Measurement error, unobserved het-
erogeneity, and reverse causation concerns are then addressed utilizing three novel identi￿cation strategies
designed to circumvent the need to identify valid exclusion restrictions in the usual sense. As each does so
under a di￿erent set of assumptions, utilizing all three strategies enables us to assess the robustness of the
results to the identifying assumptions.
The ￿rst method generates instruments utilizing a di￿erencing strategy based on Pitt and Rosenzweig
(1990). The key identifying assumptions are that the marginal e￿ects of certain covariates are identical
across pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive sectors, and these covariates are signi￿cantly related
to environmental stringency. The second and third methods are based on identi￿cation strategies that
utilize higher moments of the data. Klein and Vella’s (2009, 2010) and Lewbel’s (2010) approaches each
exploit conditional second moments to circumvent the need for traditional instruments. Identi￿cation is
achieved in the Klein and Vella (2009, 2010) approach by assuming that while the errors are heteroskedastic,
the conditional correlation between the errors is constant. In the Lewbel (2010) approach, identi￿cation
is achieved through the presence of covariates related to the conditional variance of the ￿rst-stage errors,
but not the conditional covariance between ￿rst- and second-stage errors.
In addition to the application, we also undertake a small-scale Monte Carlo study. While the per-
formance of the estimators considered here have been evaluated previously using simulated data, to our
knowledge these evaluations have been con￿ned to the case of a single endogenous regressor. Here, we ver-
ify that each method extends to the case of multiple endogenous variables (as in our application). We also
undertake a so-called empirical Monte Carlo design based on Huber et al. (2010) that simulates placebo
values of the endogenous variables within the real data from our analysis.
The results are striking. In terms of the estimation approaches, we indeed verify that all three identi-
￿cation strategies perform well in settings with two endogenous variables. In addition, the performances
of the Klein and Vella (2009) and Lewbel (2010) approaches are comparable to the performance of a
traditional instrumental variable (IV) estimator when strong, valid exclusion restrictions are available.
In terms of the application, using state-level panel data, we consistently ￿nd (i) evidence of environ-
mental regulation being endogenous when examining the behavior of pollution-intensive industries, (ii) a
negative impact of own environmental stringency on inbound FDI in pollution-intensive sectors, particu-
larly when measured by employment, and (iii) signi￿cantly larger e￿ects of environmental regulation once
3endogeneity is addressed. Neighboring environmental regulation is not an important determinant of FDI
(although the estimates are relatively imprecise in the analysis and the empirical Monte Carlo study).
However, spillovers from other attributes are present (although not the focus of this study), indicating the
importance of incorporating spatial e￿ects more generally in models of FDI determination. Thus, while
not homogeneous (as in Henderson and Millimet (2007) and Ederington et al. (2005)), environmental reg-
ulation is a signi￿cant determinant of location choice by some MNEs at least at the regional level. As such,
policymakers should be concerned about the incentives for localities to set regulation at Pareto-ine￿cient
levels and governments to in￿uence trade patterns in highly pollution-intensive industries through the
strategic manipulation of environmental policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review, con-
centrating on prior studies attempting to address endogeneity concerns. Section 3 describes the empirical
methods, the data, and the results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The literature assessing the empirical validity of the PHH has yet to reach a consensus due to the numerous
complexities confronted by researchers.1 Levinson (2008) e￿ectively separates the literature into ￿rst and
second generation studies. The ￿rst generation encompasses cross-sectional studies treating environmental
regulation as exogenous. These studies typically found no statistically meaningful evidence in support of
the PHH (and sometimes found counter-intuitive e￿ects). The second generation predominantly encom-
passes panel data studies designed to remove unobserved heterogeneity invariant along some dimension
(most often time, but occasionally across sectors di￿erentiated by pollution intensity). Panel approaches,
however, require environmental regulation to be strictly exogenous conditional on the (typically time in-
variant) unobserved heterogeneity (and other covariates). A few studies within this second generation have
attempted to relax this assumption and utilize traditional IV approaches. These second generation studies
typically ￿nd economically and statistically signi￿cant evidence in support of the PHH.
As mentioned, it is unlikely that existing panel studies are su￿cient to yield unbiased estimates of
the impact of environmental regulation on the location of economic activity and/or subsequent trade
patterns. The omission of third-country e￿ects, the omission of variables that vary over time or di￿erentially
a￿ect pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive sectors such as tax breaks and agglomeration e￿ects,
measurement error in proxies for environmental regulation, and dependence between current environmental
regulation and past (or current) shocks to economic activity point strongly to violations of strict exogeneity
1See Ja￿e et al. (1995), Copeland and Taylor (2004), and Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) for reviews of the literature.
4(e.g., Henderson 1997; List et al. 2003; Cole and Fredriksson 2009).
Recognizing this, several studies test the PHH utilizing traditional exclusion restrictions. These studies
are summarized in Table 1. At the risk of over-simplifying the literature, the instruments used generally fall
within three categories. The ￿rst set includes lagged environmental regulation or lags of other covariates
(Cole and Elliott 2005; Jug and Mirza 2005; Ederington and Minier 2003). For such variables to represent
valid instruments, the error term should not be serially correlated, which may be particularly unrealistic
if measurement error is serially correlated or agglomeration e￿ects are not accurately modeled. Both are
distinct possibilities. Serial correlation in measurement error is likely due to the use of the same imperfect
proxy over time. Agglomeration e￿ects are not likely to be modeled perfectly given their complex nature
due to multiple origins (e.g., domestic versus foreign and within and across industries) and non-linearities
(Arauzo-Carod et al. 2010).
The second set includes instruments based on the geographic dispersion of industries (Levinson and
Taylor 2008; Cole et al. 2005; Ederington et al. 2004; List et al. 2003). Speci￿cally, the level of pollution
emitted by other industries in the locations where a given industry tends to locate is used to generate
instruments. For such variables to be valid instruments, the geographic distribution of industries must be
exogenous. However, as with the ￿rst set of instruments, these instruments are likely to be correlated with
the error term if agglomeration e￿ects are not accurately modeled. In fact, the instruments fail the Sargan
overidenti￿cation test at the p < 0:01 con￿dence level in Levinson and Taylor (2008). Similar instruments
do fare better in Cole et al. (2005).
The ￿nal set of instruments include a variety of contemporaneous, location-speci￿c attributes that are
hypothesized to impact environmental regulation but not directly impact ￿rm location decisions or trade
patterns. Examples range from economic variables such as attributes of the agricultural sector, per capita
income, and public expenditures to demographic variables such as urbanization, infant mortality, popula-
tion density, and schooling to political economy variables such as corruption, and proxies for industry lobby
bargaining power. Kellenberg (2009) also utilizes some spatially lagged covariates as exclusion restrictions.
Needless to say, one can plausibly argue in each case that such variables may also directly impact ￿rm
location or trade patterns, or be correlated with the error term due to non-classical measurement error or
omitted geographic spillovers, agglomeration e￿ects, or other sources of heterogeneity. Brunnermeier and
Levinson (2004, p. 37), reviewing the literature at the time, state that \as is always true of instrumental
variable analyses, the instruments are open to critique." That said, Kellenberg (2009) is noteworthy as the
instruments fare well in terms of the usual speci￿cation tests.
Despite the suspect validity of the identi￿cation strategies employed in these prior studies, rigorous
speci￿cation testing is noticeably absent in many. A few discuss the strength of the ￿rst-stage relationship
5and/or conduct Hausman-type tests for endogeneity, but most neglect to test or even discuss why the
proposed instruments should be exogenous or excluded from the second-stage equation for location choice
or trade patterns; Levinson and Taylor (2008) and Kellenberg (2009) are notable exceptions. Nonetheless,
these studies nearly universally obtain a more detrimental e￿ect of environmental regulation on the behavior
of pollution intensive sectors once endogeneity is (attempted to be) addressed. Given this background, we
now turn to our analysis.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Structural Model
To ￿x ideas, a typical model used to assess determinants of (continuous) measures of FDI stocks or ￿ows
with panel data is a standard two-way ￿xed e￿ects speci￿cation:
ln(FDIit) = ￿i + ￿t +
P
k ￿kxikt + ’it; (1)
where FDI is some measure of MNE activity in location i and time t, xk, k = 1;:::;K, are time-varying
observable attributes of location i, ￿i and ￿t are location and period ￿xed e￿ects, respectively, and ’it is
the error term. A proxy for environmental regulation is one element in x. As is well known, consistent
estimates of the parameters in (1) requires x to be strictly exogenous.
As discussed previously, the model in (1) is potentially ￿awed due to the exclusion of geographic
spillovers. The omission of spillovers is one reason why the strict exogeneity assumption may fail in
practice. Thus, we begin by augmenting (1) to include spatially lagged counterparts for each covariate:













j2￿ !ijtxjkt, ! is the weight given by location i to neighbor j in period t, ￿
includes the set of neighbors of location i, and "it is the new error term. Even if all elements in the regressors
in the augmented model are strictly exogenous, estimation of (2) is nonstandard given the introduction of
the weights, !. To proceed, the weights must be chosen a priori.
As is well known in these types of models, the choice of the weights is ad hoc; thus, the spatially lagged
variables are potentially measured with error. Prior to discussing the weighting schemes utilized, two
comments are warranted. First, if the weights are mis-speci￿ed, this would likely attenuate the estimates
of ￿k to zero, as we are essentially looking for evidence of spillovers in the wrong place. Thus, the estimates
should be interpreted as lower bounds (in absolute value). However, if we ￿nd evidence of geographic
6spillovers, then this is not particularly problematic. Second, as discussed below, since we are treating
own and neighboring environmental regulation as endogenous, we are able to recover consistent estimates
(under the assumptions of the estimators utilized) of neighboring environmental regulation as long as the
signal-noise ratio is not negligible.
That said, we utilize three straightforward weighting schemes. First, we assign a weight of zero to
non-contiguous neighbors and equal weights to all contiguous neighbors. In other words,
P
j !ijtxjkt
simpli￿es to the mean of xjkt in neighboring states. Second, following Fredriksson and Millimet (2002),
we adopt two regional breakdowns for the 48 mainland U.S. states (see Appendix A). The use of regional
weights is also motivated by the evidence in Glick and Woodward (1987) that foreign-owned a￿liates in
manufacturing tend to serve regional markets. For each regional breakdown,
P
j !ijtxjkt simpli￿es to the
mean of xjkt in all other neighbors within the same region (again, giving each regional neighbor equal
weight). The two regional classi￿cations come from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and
Crone (1998/1999). The BEA regional classi￿cation system was introduced in the 1950s and has never
been amended. While this classi￿cation system is widely used by economists in studying regional economic
activity, Crone (1998/1999) devised an alternative regional breakdown for U.S. states using cluster analysis
to group states according to similarities in economic activity. We refer to these weighting schemes as BEA
and Crone regional weights, respectively.
Even with speci￿cation of the weights, estimation of (2) is complicated by the fact that own and
neighboring environmental regulation are likely correlated with the error term, ", due to measurement
error, spatial error correlation, unobserved heterogeneity, and/or reverse causation. Thus, traditional ￿xed
e￿ects estimates are not likely to yield consistent estimates of ￿ and ￿. Before discussing our approach to
identi￿cation, we brie￿y discuss the structure of the data as this will make the empirical approaches easier
to document. We then present each estimation method along with its results.
3.2 Data
The data come directly from Keller and Levinson (2002); thus, we provide only limited details. Summary
statistics are provided in the Appendix. The data cover the 48 contiguous U.S. states from 1977 { 1994,
omitting 1987 due to missing data on abatement costs. The measures of FDI include the value of gross
property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) of foreign-owned a￿liates for all manufacturers, as well as just
for the chemical sector (1992 { 1994 omitted), and employment at foreign-owned a￿liates for all manu-
facturers, as well as just for the chemical sector (1992 { 1994 omitted).2 The chemical sector (SIC 28) is
2For each dependent variable, the sample represents an unbalanced panel where the number of observations for total
manufacturing PP&E (employment) are 811 (814); for chemical sector PP&E (employment), the sample size is 563 (621).
7analyzed in isolation given that FDI in these industries is most likely to be responsive to spatial variation
in environmental stringency given the pollution-intensive nature of production (Ederington et al. 2005).
Consistent with ￿gures reported elsewhere, inbound FDI stocks increased tremendously over the sample
period. Aggregate manufacturing PP&E increased over tenfold from 1977 to 1994, from roughly $20 million
to nearly $300 million (in 1982 US$). An increase of similar proportion occurred in the chemical sector from
1977 to 1991, from roughly $10 million to $90 million. Employment grew at a slower, but still substantial,
rate, increasing from roughly 675,000 to almost 2.3 million in aggregate manufacturing; 190,000 to 500,000
in the chemical sector.
In the theoretical model of inbound FDI presented in Blonigen et al. (2008), determinants of FDI
include trade costs, cost and demand shifters, and parent country attributes. Here, total road mileage
and state e￿ects capture time-varying and time invariant (e.g., distance to ports) di￿erences in trade costs
across states. Population and market proximity (a distance-weighted average of all other states’ gross state
products) re￿ect market size and demand shocks. Relative abatement costs (RAC), unemployment rate,
unionization rate, average production-worker wages across the state, land prices, energy prices, and tax
e￿ort (actual tax revenues divided by those that would be collected by a model tax code, as calculated by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations) capture variation in production costs and resource
availability. RAC is the proxy for environmental regulation. This measure is attributable to Levinson
(2001) and represents the ratio of actual state-level abatement costs to predicted state-level abatement
costs, where the predicted value is based on the industrial composition of the state. Consequently, higher
values indicate relatively more stringent environmental protection. The index varies over time and across
states. Finally, since FDI is aggregated across all countries outside the U.S., time e￿ects capture parent
country attributes. All variables are expressed in logarithmic form with the exception of the unemployment
and unionization rates. In addition, we form the spatially lagged variables ￿rst and then take logs, again
with the exception of spatially lagged unemployment and unionization rates.
Prior to continuing, it is important to note that the Spearman rank correlation between RAC and
total manufacturing FDI as measured by PP&E is positive (￿ = 0:11, p = 0:003); the correlation is even
stronger when only considering the chemical sector (￿ = 0:13; p = 0:001). Neither correlation is statistically
signi￿cant using employment to measure FDI. Moreover, as shown in Keller and Levinson (2002), total
manufacturing FDI as measured by employment (and PP&E) increased by more over the sample period in
the 20 states experiencing the largest increase in RAC than in the 20 states experiencing the largest decline
in RAC. In addition, Table A1 in the Appendix shows that mean total manufacturing FDI as measured
by PP&E is higher when RAC exceeds one (indicating more stringent environmental regulation), as well
as for the chemical and non-chemical sectors considered separately. However, mean total manufacturing
8employment, as well as in the chemical and non-chemical sectors, is lower in states with RAC greater than
one. In any event, ￿nding statistical evidence consistent with the PHH, particularly using data on PP&E,
would appear to require the existence of signi￿cant selection (on either observed or unobserved variables)
into more stringent RAC.
3.3 Estimation
3.3.1 Pitt & Rosenzweig (1990) Approach
Model The ￿rst identi￿cation strategy used to address the potential endogeneity of own and spatially
lagged environmental regulation is based on the approach put forth in Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990). Pitt
and Rosenzweig (1990) are concerned with the impact of an endogenous household-level variable on chil-
dren di￿erentiated by gender. Lacking a traditional exclusion restriction, the solution proposed entails
examining the di￿erential e￿ect of the endogenous variable on sons versus daughters and generating exclu-
sion restrictions by assuming that some exogenous household-level covariates have identical e￿ects on boys
and girls. In our application, we apply this logic to assess the di￿erential e￿ect of own and spatially lagged
environmental regulation on two types of FDI: FDI in pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive sec-
tors. Valid exclusion restrictions are generated by assuming that some exogenous state-level covariates
have equal e￿ects on FDI across these two sectors.
Formally, we re-write the structural model in (2) separately for pollution-intensive (P) manufacturing



























































where K1 +K2 = K. Thus, x1 includes a subset of x for which the marginal e￿ects on FDI are allowed to
di￿er depending on the pollution intensity of the industry. The marginal e￿ects of covariates included in
x2 are assumed to be constant across sectors (and thus lack a p or np superscript). In the analysis, we take
the chemical sector as the pollution-intensive sector and all other manufacturing sectors as the (relatively)
non-pollution-intensive sector (e.g., Xing and Kolstad 2002; Wagner and Timmins 2009). While there are
9certainly other data partitions one may try (conditional on data availability), results based on treating
only the chemical sector as pollution-intensive should yield evidence of the PHH if it exists.
Subtracting (4) from (3) in each time period yields


















In (5) x2ikt and
P
j2￿ !ijtx2jkt, k = 1;:::;K2, are available as exclusion restrictions.3





2 = ￿2. If the restrictions imposed lead to an overidenti￿ed model (i.e., there are at least
two variables in x2), then the usual overidenti￿cation test constitutes a test of the restrictions imposed.
To see this, note that if ￿2k or ￿2k does in fact di￿er across sectors di￿erentiated by pollution intensity,
then the error term in (5) will contain terms such as ￿￿2kx2ikt or ￿￿2k
P48
j=1 !ijtx2jkt and the resulting
instruments will be correlated with the error.
While this approach aids in the generation of instruments for environmental regulation, it does so at
a cost (even if the restrictions are valid). Speci￿cally, the approach only provides consistent estimates





1 equal zero, this approach only identi￿es the di￿erential e￿ects of the (own and spatially
lagged) covariates in x1 on inbound FDI in pollution-intensive relative to non-pollution-intensive sectors.




1 corresponding to own and
spatially lagged environmental regulation are zero, this is unlikely to be the case. On the one hand, our
de￿nition of the non-pollution-intensive sector still includes some polluting industries since it aggregates all
manufacturing sectors except the chemical sector. On the other hand, when treating environmental regula-
tion as exogenous and ignoring geographic spillovers, Henderson and Millimet (2007) obtain some positive
and statistically meaningful nonparametric regression estimates of the association between environmental
regulation and inbound U.S. FDI. Similarly, Mulatu et al. (2010) obtain a statistically insigni￿cant, but
positive e￿ect of environmental stringency on production shares in the least pollution-intensive sectors.





3Note, this approach is similar to the strategy employed in Wagner and Timmins (2009). However, in that study, the
authors assume that environmental regulation is exogenous in their analog to the di￿erenced equation given by (5). Thus, their
identi￿cation strategy requires no location-speci￿c unobservables be correlated with environmental regulation, but di￿erentially
associated with investment across sectors by pollution intensity. As shown below, this assumption is rejected in our data.
10Results The results are presented in Panels A (PP&E) and B (employment) in Table 2. The speci￿cations
estimated correspond to (5) except that the di￿erenced state ￿xed e￿ects, e ￿i, are replaced with region
dummies. Thus, we are assuming that time invariant attributes that di￿erentially a￿ect sectors according
to their pollution intensity are constant within regions. Estimation is performed using ordinary least squares
(OLS) and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) which has been shown to perform relatively
well in small samples with weaker instruments (e.g., Stock et al. 2002; Flores-Lagunes 2007). The variables
in x2 include market proximity, population, and tax e￿ort as such variables should be equally relevant to all
manufacturing industries. Four speci￿cations are estimated. Speci￿cation 1 omits all geographic spillovers.
Speci￿cations 2-4 include such spillovers, where Speci￿cation 2 uses the contiguous weighting scheme and
Speci￿cations 3 and 4 use the BEA and Crone regional weighting schemes, respectively. Finally, note that
we only display the point estimates for own and neighboring environmental regulation to conserve space.
Full estimation results are available upon request.
Turning to the results, four ￿ndings emerge. First, the OLS estimates are negative and statistically
signi￿cant, as well as signi￿cantly larger in magnitude than the estimates reported in Keller and Levinson
(2002). This di￿erence follows from a change in the de￿nition of the dependent variable, as well as
the fact that the model in (5) eliminates time-varying unobservables that are correlated with both FDI
and environmental regulation, but a￿ect FDI equally across sectors (e.g., local macroeconomic shocks
or political corruption). In addition, the OLS estimates are fairly stable across the four speci￿cations;
neighboring environmental regulation is statistically signi￿cant only in Speci￿cation 2.
Second, the identi￿cation strategy works well as determined by the usual IV speci￿cation tests, partic-
ularly when using employment to measure FDI. Speci￿cally, we reject the null that the model is underi-
denti￿ed at the p < 0:01 con￿dence level in every case using Kleibergen and Paap’s (2006) rk statistic, and
the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F-statistic is reasonably large. In addition, we fail to reject the validity of
the instruments using Hansen’s overidenti￿cation test in all cases when using employment to measure FDI,
and in Speci￿cations 2 and 3 in Panel A at the p < 0:05 con￿dence level. Thus, the Pitt and Rosenzweig
(1990) approach fares well in the current application. Third, in both panels, we reject exogeneity of own
environmental regulation in Speci￿cation 1 and own and neighboring environmental regulation in Speci￿ca-
tions 2-4. Thus, strict exogeneity of own and spatially lagged environmental regulation is overwhelmingly
rejected.
Finally, the LIML estimates are statistically signi￿cant at the p < 0:01 con￿dence level using either the
traditional approach or the Anderson and Rubin (1949) test robust to weak instruments. Moreover, the
point estimates are considerably larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates in absolute value; however,
the standard errors are also roughly four to ￿ve times larger. Neighboring environmental regulation is
11rarely statistically signi￿cant although the estimates are very imprecise.
While the point estimates for own environmental regulation are economically large, and we will return
to the issue of precision later, it helps to put the magnitude in context since the dependent variable is
now the log di￿erence in pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive FDI. For example, consider the
results in Panel B, Speci￿cation 1. Ohio in 1991 had 17,600 (104,900) workers in foreign-owned a￿liates
in the chemical sector (all other manufacturing sectors); thus, relative employment in the chemical sector
was 16.8%. The value of its RAC index was 0.86, making it a fairly lax state according to the index. The
ceteris paribus e￿ect of Ohio increasing its RAC at the time to match California (1.00) would have been
a decline in relative employment in the chemical sector to 10.8%. In contrast, the OLS estimate implies
a decline to only 15.4%. What is not known is how much of this change is due to a relative decline in
employment in the pollution-intensive sector and how much is due to a relative increase in employment in
the non-pollution-intensive sector. As stated previously, Henderson and Millimet (2007) ￿nd heterogeneous,
and often positive, associations between own environmental regulation and total manufacturing FDI when
treating regulation as exogenous.
Before turning to the next identi￿cation strategy, we attempt a (partial) falsi￿cation test of the Pitt and
Rosenzweig (1990) approach in the current context. Speci￿cally, we exclude the food and kindred products
industry (SIC 20) from our original de￿nition of the non-pollution-intensive sector (all manufacturing
except the chemical industry) and treat this as our pollution-intensive sector. Our new de￿nition of the
non-pollution-intensive sector is all manufacturing industries except the chemical sector and the food and
kindred products sector. Thus, we are attempting to compare two relatively non-pollution-intensive sectors
by (incorrectly) treating the food and kindred products sector as pollution-intensive. As a result, if the
identi￿cation strategy is valid and food and kindred products really is no more pollution-intensive than the
average (non-chemical) manufacturing industry, we would expect to ￿nd statistically insigni￿cant e￿ects
of own and neighboring environmental regulation.
The results are presented in Table 3.4 Of the eight models estimated using LIML, the instruments
pass the overidenti￿cation test in ￿ve. In these ￿ve models, only one of eight coe￿cient estimates related
to own or neighboring environmental regulation is statistically signi￿cant at even the p < 0:10 con￿dence
level. This is only marginally greater than is to be expected by chance. Thus, we interpret this as evidence
in favor of the identi￿cation strategy.
4Note, the number of observations di￿ers from Table 2 due missing data on FDI in the food and kindred products sector.
123.3.2 Lewbel (2010) Approach
Model The next two identi￿cation strategies used to address the potential endogeneity of own and
neighboring environmental regulation exploit the conditional second moments of the endogenous variables.
Lewbel (2010) complements earlier work by Vella and Verbeek (1997), Lewbel (1997), Rigobon (2003), and
Ebbes et al. (2004) and, as in the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, generates instruments that are
valid under certain assumptions.
To proceed, we re-write the FDI equation given in (2) together with the ￿rst-stage speci￿cations for
own and neighboring environmental regulation to make matters explicit. The system of equations is
ln(FDIit) = Xit￿ + ￿ ln(RACit) + ￿ ln(
P
j2￿ !ijtRACjt) + "it (6)
ln(RACit) = Xit￿1 + ￿1it (7)
ln(
P
j2￿ !ijtRACjt) = Xit￿2 + ￿2it; (8)
where RAC is the measure of relative abatement costs, X includes all the other regressors from x in (2)
except RAC (i.e., including the spatial terms and the state and time ￿xed e￿ects), and ￿1 and ￿2 are
the error terms in the ￿rst-stage equations assumed to be correlated with ". As stated, the model is not
identi￿ed since there are no exclusion restrictions in (7) and (8). However, Lewbel (2010) shows that if ￿1
and ￿2 are heteroskedastic and at least a subset of the elements of X are correlated with the error variances
but not with the error covariances, then the model is identi￿ed.
Formally, the Lewbel (2010) approach entails choosing zr ￿ X such that
E[z0
r￿2
r] 6= 0 (9)
E[z0
r"￿r] = 0 (10)
for r = 1;2. If these assumptions are satis￿ed, then e zr ￿ (zr ￿ z)￿r, r = 1;2, are valid instruments. If
the errors contain a common (homoskedastic) factor, along with heteroskedastic idiosyncratic components
(where the heteroskedasticity of ￿r depends on zr), then these assumptions will be satis￿ed. Formally, if
we can re-write the errors in (6) { (8) as
"it ￿ ￿it + e "it
￿rit ￿ ￿it + e ￿rit; r = 1;2;
where ￿ is homoskedastic, e ￿r, r = 1;2, is heteroskedastic (with variance depending on zr), and e ￿r,
r = 1;2, and e " are independent of each other and ￿, then (9) and (10) are satis￿ed. This data-generating
13process (DGP) is plausible if ￿ represents homoskedastic measurement error in environmental stringency,
or a composite index of unobserved variables impacting both environmental stringency and FDI (such
as those discussed previously) is drawn from an identical distribution across observations. However, the
idiosyncratic shocks to environmental stringency may be drawn from di￿erent distributions.
In the analysis, we use the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity to identify variables signi￿cantly
related to the ￿rst-stage error variances. We include land prices, total road mileage, and market proximity
in z1; the spatially-lagged counterparts are included in z2. The instruments, e zr, are then created by
replacing ￿r with its estimate obtained from (consistent) OLS estimates of the ￿rst-stage. See Appendix
B for further estimation details.
Prior to continuing, it is interesting to note { with further examination { that land prices and total road
mileage are associated with a lower variance of ￿1; neighboring land prices and total road mileage (market
proximity) are associated with a lower (higher) variance of ￿2. In Keller and Levinson (2002), land prices
and total road mileage are negatively associated with FDI in￿ows, whereas market proximity is positively
related. Thus, the pattern of heteroskedasticity is consistent with the notion that states with less favorable
attributes for attracting FDI minimize the volatility in another attribute, environmental stringency, that
may adversely impact inbound FDI.
Results The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5, where the di￿erent panels and speci￿cations are
identical to Tables 2 and 3. Table 4 contains the results for the chemical sector only; Table 5 assesses total
manufacturing. In the tables, the OLS estimates are presented for comparison, where the Speci￿cation
1 results are identical to Keller and Levinson (2002). The estimates obtained using the Lewbel (2010)
approach are given under the column labelled ‘IV’.
As with the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, four salient ￿ndings emerge. First, the OLS es-
timates are negative and statistically signi￿cant in the vast majority of cases. The main exception is
when examining FDI as measured by employment in total manufacturing (Panel B, Table 5). In addition,
the OLS estimates are fairly stable across the four speci￿cations; neighboring environmental regulation is
statistically signi￿cant only in Speci￿cations 2 and 3 when assessing employment in the chemical sector
(Panel B, Table 4). Inclusion of the spatial e￿ects has little e￿ect on the estimated marginal e￿ect of own
environmental regulation.
Second, as with the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, the Lewbel (2010) identi￿cation strategy
works well as determined by the usual IV speci￿cation tests when geographic spillovers are omitted (Spec-
i￿cation 1) as well as in the majority of cases when spatial e￿ects are included (particularly when using
14the two regional weighting schemes in Speci￿cations 3 and 4).5 Speci￿cally, we reject the null that the
model is underidenti￿ed at the p < 0:01 con￿dence level in every case using Anderson’s (1951) canonical
correlation test, and the Cragg and Donald (1993) F-statistic is reasonably large. In addition, we fail to
reject the validity of the instruments using Anderson and Rubin’s (1950) overidenti￿cation test in all cases
but one at the p < 0:10 con￿dence level for Speci￿cations 1, 3, and 4. In addition, Speci￿cation 2 fares well
in terms of these tests when examining total manufacturing. Thus, the Lewbel (2010) approach performs
well.
Third, when focusing on the cases that pass the speci￿cation tests, we reject exogeneity of own (and
neighboring) environmental regulation in the majority of cases for the chemical sector. There is much
less support for endogeneity when examining total manufacturing. Thus, there is only strong evidence of
endogeneity when focusing on the most pollution-intensive sectors.
Finally, turning to the point estimates in the cases that pass the speci￿cation tests for the chemical
sector (Table 4), the LIML estimates are statistically signi￿cant at at least the p < 0:10 con￿dence level
using either the traditional approach or the Anderson and Rubin (1949) test robust to weak instruments;
often statistically signi￿cant at the p < 0:01 con￿dence level. Moreover, as with the Pitt and Rosenzweig
(1990) approach, the point estimates are larger in absolute value compared to OLS; however, the standard
errors are also roughly two to three times larger. Neighboring environmental regulation is statistically
signi￿cant in Speci￿cation 3, but not Speci￿cation 4. Thus, choice of weighting scheme does matter in
meaningful ways.
To put the magnitude of the e￿ects in context, we return to the previous thought experiment. Using
the results in Panel B, Speci￿cation 4, if Ohio in 1991 had raised the value of its RAC index from 0.86
to match California (1.00), then employment in foreign-owned a￿liates in the chemical sector would have
been expected to decline from 17,600 to roughly 15,100. In contrast, the OLS estimate implies a decline
to only about 16,500.
In terms of the total manufacturing results (Table 5), we often fail to reject exogeneity as noted
previously. Moreover, adding the spatial e￿ects has little in￿uence on the estimates from Keller and
Levinson (2002); Kellenberg (2009) obtains a similar ￿nding. One noteworthy ￿nding, however, occurs in
Speci￿cation 3 when examining employment (Panel B). Here, we do reject exogeneity and the IV point
estimate indicates a positive and statistically signi￿cant e￿ect of own environmental regulation. While
we are cautious about putting too much stock in any one estimate given the number of speci￿cations
estimated, this is consistent with the heterogeneous e￿ects documented elsewhere in the prior literature
5Note, for computational reasons, we follow Keller and Levinson (2002) and do not present robust standard errors here; in
several speci￿cations, the robust estimate of the covariance matrix was not of full rank.
15(e.g., Henderson and Millimet 2007). In particular, this result and the prior results for the chemical sector
only highlight the fact that the impact of environmental regulation (as well as its statistical properties)
depends on the pollution intensity of the industry, consistent with existing studies (e.g., Ederington et al.
2005; Jug and Mirza 2005; Mulatu et al. 2010).
3.3.3 Klein & Vella (2009) Approach
Model The ￿nal identi￿cation strategy is based on the parametric implementation of the estimator
proposed in Klein and Vella (2009, 2010) and expanded upon in Farr￿ e et al. (2010). To proceed, consider
the system of equations given in (6) { (8). In addition to being mean zero, the following assumptions are




rit; r = 1;2 (12)
S"(zit)=Sr(zit); r = 1;2; varies across i (13)
E["￿
it￿￿
rit] = ￿r; r = 1;2 (14)
where "￿
it and ￿￿
rit are homoskedastic errors and z ￿ X. Thus, at least some of the errors are required to be
heteroskedastic in such a way that the ratio S"(zit)=Sr(zit), r = 1;2; varies across observations. However,
the conditional correlation, ￿r, r = 1;2, between the underlying homoskedastic portion of the errors must
be ￿xed. Note, while the three heteroskedasticity terms { S"(zit) and Sr(zit), r = 1;2 { are written as a
function of the same set of covariates, z, this need not be the case. There are no restrictions on which
variables may enter each of these terms.
Klein and Vella (2010) give some examples of DGPs satisfying these assumptions. One such case arises
if there exists a common factor, as in the Lewbel (2010) approach. However, here the common factor enters
multiplicatively and may itself be heteroskedastic. Speci￿cally, if we can write the errors as
"it = S"(zit)￿ite "it
￿rit = Sr(zit)￿ite ￿rit; r = 1;2
where e " and e ￿r are mean-zero, independent of X and ￿, and have a constant correlation given by ￿r, then
(11) { (14) are satis￿ed.
Reverting back to (14), it is worth considering what this identi￿cation condition implies. One possible
interpretation includes viewing "￿
it and ￿￿
rit, r = 1;2, as correlated measures of agglomeration. Agglomera-
tion may a￿ect environmental stringency due to the scale e￿ect of pollution-generating activity. However,
16the impact may depend on state-level attributes, zit. For instance, states with attributes that are not con-
ducive to attracting FDI may limit the impact of agglomeration on environmental stringency. Similarly,
own agglomeration may impact FDI through economies of scale, but the e￿ect may depend on state-level
attributes as well. Neighboring agglomeration may adversely impact FDI by improving the desirability of
neighboring locations. However, once we condition on these state-level attributes, the return to own and
neighboring agglomeration, ￿1 and ￿2, respectively, are constant. While not testable, this seems plausible.






exp(zrit￿r); r = 1;2 (16)
where z1 (z2) includes own (spatially lagged) land prices, total road mileage, and market proximity (as
in the Lewbel (2010) approach). Using the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity to identify variables
likely to be related to the structural error variance in the FDI equations, we include average production
worker wages, population, and market proximity in z" when examining FDI in the chemical sector; market
proximity only is included when examining total manufacturing FDI.6
With this setup, (6) may be rewritten as
ln(FDIit) = Xit￿ + ￿ ln(RACit) + ￿ ln(
P












S2(zit)￿2it is a control function and e e "it is a well-behaved error term. Given the
functional form assumptions in (15) and (16), (17) can be estimated by nonlinear least squares (NLS) in
a number of ways. Standard errors are obtained via bootstrap. See Appendix B for further estimation
details.
Results The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 under the column labelled ‘CF’. In Table 4 (chemical
sector), the point estimates are fairly stable across the four speci￿cations, particularly in Panel A (PP&E)
and especially when one considers the size of the standard errors.7 Moreover, while the coe￿cients on
own environmental regulation are roughly similar to those obtained using the Lewbel (2010) approach,
they are never statistically signi￿cant at the p < 0:10 con￿dence level due to the relatively large standard
errors. Neighboring environmental regulation is also never statistically signi￿cant (although the estimates
6Average production wages and population are excluded when examining total manufacturing FDI due to problems with
convergence.
7Standard errors are obtaining using 1000 bootstrap repititions.
17are even more imprecise) and inclusion of the spatial e￿ects has little in￿uence on the estimated marginal
e￿ects of own environmental regulation.
In terms of total manufacturing (Table 5), the results are consistent with the OLS and Lewbel (2010)
approaches, particularly when considering the size of the standard errors. Thus, there is no statistically
meaningful evidence of a negative impact of own environmental regulation, or of neighboring environmental
regulation, on FDI in￿ows across the manufacturing sector as a whole.
In sum, the three identi￿cation strategies provide a consistent picture: own environmental regulation
has an economically signi￿cant e￿ect on the spatial distribution of FDI in￿ows in pollution-intensive sectors
across U.S. states. However, there is little impact of environmental regulation on the location choice of
manufacturing FDI as a whole. The estimates are statistically meaningful when using the Lewbel (2010)
or Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach. Moreover, controlling for endogeneity, although not spatial
e￿ects, is crucial in empirical analyses of the PHH. All three estimators indicate much larger (but less
precisely estimated) e￿ects on FDI in￿ows in pollution-intensive sectors than suggested by traditional panel
data estimates. The downward (in absolute value) bias of OLS estimates may be attributable in part to
measurement error and in part to unobservables positively correlated with both environmental regulation
and FDI in￿ows. For instance, Becker (2011) ￿nds that there is signi￿cant variation in environmental
compliance costs across counties within states; roughly one-third of counties di￿er signi￿cantly from their
state average. Thus, signi￿cant attenuation bias due to measurement error is clearly plausible. Similarly, a
multitude of unobservables (such as investments in other public goods or agglomeration e￿ects) as well as
omitted within-state variation in the observables included in the analysis, can explain the bias in estimates
obtained under the assumption of strict exogeneity.
3.4 Monte Carlo Study
Prior to concluding, we undertake two small-scale Monte Carlo experiments for two reasons. First, given
that the identi￿cation strategies utilized herein are somewhat unorthodox, it is worthwhile to illustrate their
performance using simulated data. Second, as stated in the Introduction, existing analyses or applications
of these methods focus nearly exclusively on the case of a single endogenous regressor; we verify that each
method extends to the case of two endogenous variables. Note, however, due to the usual limitation of
Monte Carlo evidence { the fact that results may be speci￿c to the DGPs considered { our aim is not to
set up a ‘horse-race’ between the di￿erent approaches. Rather, our aim is simply to verify the performance
of each approach in a setting where the identifying assumptions hold.
18The ￿rst Monte Carlo design is based on the following data-generating process:
Outcomes: yp = 0:5 + 0:5x1 + 0:5x2 ￿ R1 + R2 + "p
ynp = 0:25 + 0:5x1 + 0:5x2 + "np
First-Stage : R1 = 1 + 0:25x1 ￿ 0:75x2 + ￿1
R2 = 1 ￿ 0:75x1 + 0:25x2 + ￿2
Covariates : x1;x2
iid ￿ N (0;1)
Errors : "p = S"(x)"￿
￿r = Sr(x)￿￿










































where R1 and R2 are the two endogenous covariates, yp is the outcome used to assess the performance of
the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009) approaches, and yp ￿ ynp is the di￿erenced outcome used
to assess the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach where the (correct) assumption that x1 and x2 have
identical e￿ects is used to identify the model. Thus, the true parameters of interest are -1 and 1 for all three
estimators. Finally, note that (x2 ￿x2)￿1 and (x1 ￿x1)￿2 satisfy the requirements for valid instruments in
the Lewbel (2010) approach, while the error structure also satis￿es the setup in the Klein and Vella (2009)
approach.
We perform this exercise twice; once using 1000 simulations of sample size 750 (roughly the size in
our application) and once using 100 simulations of sample size 5,000. For comparison, we also simulate
analogous data sets with traditional exclusion restrictions. In this case, the ￿rst-stage data-generating
process becomes
First-Stage : R1 = 1 + 0:25x1 ￿ 0:75x2 + 0:75z1 + 0:25z2 + ￿1
R2 = 1 ￿ 0:75x1 + 0:25x2 + 0:25z1 + 0:75z2 + ￿2
where z1;z2
iid ￿ N (0;1). The remainder of the data-generating process is unaltered. As in the Pitt and
Rosenzweig (1990) and Lewbel (2010) approaches, we obtain the traditional IV results using LIML.
19The results are presented in Table 6; OLS results are also included for comparison. The simulations
indicate that all three (non-OLS, non-traditional IV) estimators perform well overall and similarly to
traditional IV. In the small sample, the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) and Lewbel (2010) approaches are
superior in terms of bias (along with traditional IV); Lewbel (2010) yields the lowest mean absolute error
(MAE) and root mean squared error (RMSE) followed closely by and Klein and Vella (2009) and traditional
IV. Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) has a MAE and RMSE substantially larger than the other three (non-
OLS) estimators despite having an average bias near zero. In large samples, all four (non-OLS) estimators
perform very well, with both the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009) approaches matching the
performance of traditional IV.
The second Monte Carlo design is a so-called empirical Monte Carlo study, developed in Huber et
al. (2010). The authors \... suggest a di￿erent approach of conducting simulations ... using the real
data to simulate realistic ‘placebo treatments’ among the non-treated" (p. 3). In their application, since
the focus is on the performance of several estimators of the e￿ect of a binary regressor, the simulations
entail restricting the sample to only those observations for whom their actual value of the regressor is zero,
arbitrarily recoding the regressor to one for a subset of this sample, and then estimating the e￿ect of the
simulated binary regressor. In light of this setup, the ‘true’ e￿ect of the simulated regressor is zero.
In our application, the process is a bit more complex for three reasons: (i) there are two variables of
interest, (ii) the variables of interest are continuous, and (iii) our estimators require modeling the simulated
variable in a particular way for identi￿cation. To proceed, we use the following algorithm:
1. For each observation i, i = 1;:::;NT, in the real data, simulate a value for RAC by drawing a value
from its empirical distribution. In practice, this entails drawing a random number, s, between 1 and
NT and de￿ning the simulated value of RAC for observation i as the value of RAC from observation
s.
2. For each observation i, i = 1;:::;NT, in the real data, simulate a value for neighboring RAC by
drawing a value from its empirical distribution following the procedure in step 1.
3. Because we need the variables in x2 to be correlated with own and neighboring RAC in the Pitt
and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, as well as z1 and z2 to be associated with the variance of own and
neighboring RAC in the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009) approaches, we also borrow the
values of these variables from the observations chosen in steps 1 and 2.8
8For example, in the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, the instruments used in the di￿erenced equation are market
proximity, population, tax e￿ort, and their corresponding spatial lags. Thus, as instruments in the di￿erenced equation that
now contains the simulated values of own and spatially lagged RAC we use the values of market proximity, population, tax
204. After simulating the values of own and neighboring RAC (and the corresponding values in x2, z1,
and z2), we apply each estimator to the data and compare the resulting estimates to the ‘true’ values
of zero.
OLS results are presented in Table 7, as well as for the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009) approaches.
Note, now OLS is the preferred estimator since the DGP eliminates the endogeneity issue. Table 8 contains
the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach results.
The results con￿rm the good performance of all four estimators in terms of bias. However, as in the
￿rst experimental design with entirely simulated data, the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach yields less
precise estimates than the other three estimators. Between the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009)
estimators, the Lewbel (2010) approach tends to outperform Klein and Vella (2009) approach in terms of
precision. As expected, OLS outperforms the Lewbel (2010) approach, producing RMSEs about one-third
to one-half the size.
In sum, both Monte Carlo experiments highlight the usefulness of all three identi￿cation strategies
employed in the current application when the identifying assumptions hold, as well as show how these
estimators can perform well even with multiple endogenous variables. Moreover, the simulations shed
some light on how to carefully interpret the ￿ndings in the current application. First, the simulations
point to the added variability of the estimates obtained using the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach in
small samples, as well as the modest improvement in precision with the Lewbel (2010) approach relative to
the Klein and Vella (2009) estimator in our data. That said, it is important to re-iterate that (i) our Monte
Carlo study is limited to a speci￿c simulated DGP as well as the data from our application and (ii) our
implementation of Klein and Vella’s (2009) estimator is based on a particular parametric implementation.
Certainly more detailed comparisons are required before making general statements regarding the relative
performance of the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009) approaches. Moreover, since each relies on
a di￿erent set of identifying assumptions, ‘ranking’ the two approaches is not meaningful unless both sets
of assumptions hold in a given data set. Nonetheless, the Monte Carlo results provide some additional
context with which to interpret the magnitudes obtained using the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach
in the current application, as well as the larger standard errors when using the Klein and Vella (2009)
approach.
Second, the simulations in the empirical Monte Carlo study indicate that all three estimators yield much
e￿ort, and their corresponding spatial lags from the same observations used to obtain the simulated values of RAC and
neighboring RAC in steps 1 and 2. If we did not do this, the estimator would perform extremely poorly because the true
values of the instruments would fail to be correlated with the simulated endogenous regressors. Similar logic applies to the
other two estimation approaches.
21more precise estimates of the e￿ect of own environmental regulation relative to neighboring environmental
regulation. This is especially true when using the Crone regional weighting scheme. Thus, some caution
should be exhibited concluding that spatial e￿ects are unimportant in empirical models of the PHH (as
was already suggested by the large standard errors discussed previously).
4 Conclusion
The debate over the empirical validity of the PHH is heated and for good reason; the answer has far-reaching
consequences at the local, national, and international levels. To date, however, empirical assessments of the
PHH have been hampered by the lack of a credible identi￿cation strategy to overcome potential problems
associated with measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, the empirical literature on
the PHH has yet to adequately incorporate lessons from the literature on so-called third-country e￿ects.
Here, we propose three novel identi￿cation strategies couched within a model that incorporates spatial
e￿ects. A traditional Monte Carlo design, as well as an empirical Monte Carlo experiment, give us con￿-
dence in these approaches in the current context, one that includes two endogenous covariates. Together,
the three approaches shed new light on the role of environmental regulation in the determination of FDI
location.
Speci￿cally, using state-level panel data from 1977-1994 from the U.S., we consistently ￿nd (i) evidence
of environmental regulation being endogenous when examining the pollution-intensive chemical sector, (ii)
a negative and economically signi￿cant impact of own environmental stringency on inbound FDI in the
chemical sector, particularly when measured by employment, and (iii) signi￿cantly larger e￿ects of envi-
ronmental regulation on the chemical sector once endogeneity is addressed. The upward bias in standard
￿xed e￿ects estimates obtained under the assumption of strict exogeneity is consistent with attenuation
bias due to measurement error, as well as important unobservables positively correlated with environmen-
tal regulation and FDI in￿ows (such as tax breaks, investments in other public goods, or agglomeration
externalities).
While informative, continued research is warranted. First, the analysis here is at the regional level.
Before reaching important policy conclusions regarding such issues as the WTO’s justi￿cation to intervene
in the domestic environmental policy arena or the sensibility of linking international environmental and
trade agreements, further analysis is needed to determine the external validity of the ￿ndings obtained
here. Does environmental regulation have similar e￿ects at the country level? Despite this unknown, our
results do ￿rmly indicate that policymakers should worry about the incentives for local environmental
standards to deviate from Pareto-e￿cient levels. Such fears are particularly worrisome since prior evidence
22suggests that domestic investment may be even more sensitive to spatial variation in environmental policy
than foreign investment (e.g., List et al. 2004).
Second, the prior literature, while su￿ering from various de￿ciencies, has emphasized the heterogeneous
e￿ects of environmental regulation along numerous dimensions. For instance, Ederington et al. (2005) point
to substantial heterogeneity across source country (of imports) and the pollution intensity and geographic
mobility of the industrial sector. Dean et al. (2009) similarly document important heterogeneity by
source country (of foreign investment). Henderson and Millimet (2007) and Millimet and List (2004)
uncover heterogeneous e￿ects utilizing nonparametric and semiparametric methods, respectively. Some
of this heterogeneity is captured in this study; namely, di￿erential e￿ects by pollution intensity of the
manufacturing sector as well as by measure of FDI (PP&E versus employment). However, other dimensions
of heterogeneity uncovered by the prior literature cannot be addressed given the data and identi￿cation
strategies utilized here. Future research investigating whether the empirical evidence of heterogeneous
e￿ects continues to be present once measurement error, spatial e￿ects, and unobserved heterogeneity are
accounted for is needed for a deeper understanding of the linkages between environmental and trade policy.
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28A Data Appendix
The BEA regional classi￿cation is as follows.
1. New England: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut
2. Mideast: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland
3. Great Lakes: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin
4. Plains: Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas
5. Southeast: Georgia, Florida, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana
6. Southwest: Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico
7. Rocky Mountain: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah
8. Far West: Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada
The Crone (1998/1999) regions { based on a cluster analysis of similar economic activity { are as follows.
1. Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Arizona, Utah, Montana
2. Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Iowa, Delaware
3. Georgia, Florida, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama,
Mississippi, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Rhode Island
4. New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Connecticut, West Virginia, Vermont
5. Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Idaho, Nebraska, Texas, Wyoming, Minnesota, Louisiana,
Kansas
6. North Dakota, South Dakota, Colorado, New Mexico, Wisconsin
29Table A1.  Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
Total Manufacturing FDI (PP&E) 811 2859.31 3919.40 449 2796.21 3610.31 362 2937.57 4275.67
Chemical Sector FDI (PP&E) 563 1016.94 1732.51 323 812.53 1117.36 240 1292.04 2289.90
Non-Chemical Sector FDI (PP&E) 563 1491.44 1923.02 323 1440.59 1703.17 240 1559.88 2186.17
Total Manufacturing FDI (Employment) 814 32680.75 36602.64 452 37596.70 39038.80 362 26542.60 32329.69
Chemical Sector FDI (Employment) 621 7691.73 9641.22 349 8760.95 10820.55 272 6319.83 7677.71
Non-Chemical Sector FDI (Employment) 621 23377.44 26783.65 349 26047.92 26573.23 272 19950.99 26710.69
Relative Abatement Costs (RAC) 816 1.02 0.37 452 0.76 0.16 364 1.34 0.31
Unemployment Rate 816 6.61 2.09 452 6.14 1.87 364 7.20 2.21
Agricultural Land Values ($/per acre) 816 887.02 775.04 452 974.93 896.84 364 777.84 572.50
Energy Prices, Industrial Sector 816 5.51 1.70 452 5.89 1.85 364 5.04 1.35
Highway Road Mileage 816 80500.90 48367.55 452 82200.68 42205.87 364 78390.18 55056.13
Population (millions) 816 4.94 5.13 452 5.45 5.43 364 4.30 4.67
Unionization Rate 816 16.55 6.71 452 17.37 6.86 364 15.54 6.38
Average Production Worker Wages,  816 9.10 2.24 452 9.09 2.28 364 9.10 2.19
     Manufacturing Sector ($/hr)
Tax Effort 816 96.06 16.05 452 98.51 18.89 364 93.01 10.88
Market Proximity 816 6630.94 8220.03 452 8218.10 9694.03 364 4660.08 5283.64
RAC > 1 RAC ≤ 1 Full SampleB Estimation Algorithms
B.1 Lewbel (2010) Approach
Estimation of the empirical model
ln(FDIit) = Xit￿ + ￿ ln(RACit) + ￿ ln(
P
j2￿ !ijtRACjt) + "it
proceeds as follows:
1. Regress ln(RACit) on Xit and obtain b ￿1it
2. Regress ln(
P
j2￿ !ijtRACjt) on Xit and obtain b ￿2it
3. Form instruments e zrit ￿ (zrit ￿ z)b ￿rit, r = 1;2
4. Estimate the structural model via Limited Information Maximum Likelihood using e zrit, r = 1;2, as
instruments for ln(RACit) and ln(
P
j2￿ !ijtRACjt).
B.2 Klein & Vella (2009) Approach
Estimation of the empirical model
ln(FDIit) = Xit￿ + ￿ ln(RACit) + ￿ ln(
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306. Estimate via OLS:
ln(FDIit) = Xit￿ + ￿ ln(RACit) + ￿ ln(
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7. Compute standard errors via bootstrap.
31Table 1.  Select Review of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis Literature with Endogenous Environmental Regulation.
Study Dependent Data Primary Measure of  Primary Instruments
Variable Environmental Regulation
Mulatu et al. (2010) Industry shares 13 countries and 16 ISIC industries 
averaged over 1990–1994
Environmental Sustainability Index in 
2001
Corruption in 1995; income in 1992; urbanization in 1997; 
schooling in 1990
Kellenberg (2009) Value added of majority owned U.S. 
multinational affiliates 
50 countries and nine industries over 
1999-2003
Two survey-based responses from 
executives concerning environmental 
stringency and consistency of 
enforcement
Own country: arable land/agricultural worker; 
tractors/agricultural worker.  Spatial lag of other countries in 
same region (weighted by GDP): land/agricultural worker; 
tractors/agricultural worker; public schools; capital/labor 
ratio; infrastructure; organized crime.
Cole and Fredriksson (2009) Inbound FDI stocks and flows divided by 
aggregate GDP
13 OECD and 20 developing countries 
over 1982-1992
Lead content of gasoline Total population
Levinson and Taylor (2008) U.S. net imports divided by the value of 
shipments
132 3-digit manufacturing sectors from 
Mexico and Canada over 1977-1986
PAOC per unit of value added The amount of a pollutant contributed by other sectors in the 
states in which the sector tends to locate (14 pollutants yields 
14 instruments); weighted average of state per capita 
incomes
Cole and Elliott (2005) U.S. outbound FDI stocks in Brazil and 
Mexico divided by total U.S. stocks in 
each country
31 (Brazil) or 36 (Mexico) 3-digit U.S. 
SIC industries over 1989-1994
PAOC per unit of value added Lagged PAOC per unit of value added over 1973-1978; 
industry-level pollution intensity in 1987
Cole et al. (2005) U.S. net exports as a share of value added 3-digit U.S. SIC industries over 1978-
1992, except 1979 and 1987
PAOC per unit of value added Follow Levinson and Taylor (2008); six types of air pollution 
yields six instruments
Jug and Mirza (2005) Imports as a share of domestic sales Nine 2-digit ISIC industries; 12 importing 
countries from the EU15 and 19 exporting 
countries from the EU15 and Central and 
Eastern Europe over 1996-1999
Environmental expenditures for total 
manufacturing
Total public expenditure; lagged investment in 
environmental equipment; lagged wages
Ederington et al. (2004) U.S. imports divided by the value of 
shipments
394 4-digit U.S. SIC industries fover 
1978-1994 except 1979 and 1987
PAOC per unit of total materials costs Similar to Levinson and Taylor (2008) based on geographic 
dispersion of industries
List et al. (2004) Number of manufacturing plant 
modifications and closures
New York State county-level data over 
1980-1990
Ozone attainment status Proportion of all contiguous western neighbors that are out of 
attainment
List et al. (2003) Number of new manufacturing plants New York State county-level data over 
1980-1990
Ozone attainment status Proportion of all contiguous western neighbors that are out of 
attainment
Fredriksson et al. (2003) U.S. state-level inbound FDI stocks across 
states
U.S. state-level panel data from four 
manufacturing sectors over 1977-1986
Levinson (2001) index of state-level 
relative PAOC
Per capita GSP and the share of legal services in GSP; non-
military government employment and the interaction between 
non-military government employment and share of legal 
services in GSP; corruption and its interaction with tax 
effort; corruption squared and its interaction with tax effort
Ederington and Minier (2003) U.S. net imports divided by the value of 
shipments
374 4-digit U.S. SIC industries over 1978-
1992, except 1979 and 1987
PAOC per unit of total materials costs Four-firm concentration ratio; number of firms; value of 
shipments; percentage of unionized workers; industry 
unemployment rates; lagged changes in import and export 
penetrations; recent industry growth; lagged total tradeTable 1 (cont.).  Select Review of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis Literature with Endogenous Environmental Regulation.
Study Dependent Data Primary Measure of  Primary Instruments
Variable Environmental Regulation
Cole and Elliott (2003) Net exports Four manufacturing sectors in 60 
countries from 1995
Index of environmental stringency from 
Eliste and Fredriksson (2004); proxy 
based on a change in energy intensity 
over 1980-1985 and level of energy 
intensity in 1980
Per capita income
Xing and Kolstad (2002) U.S. outbound FDI Six manfacturing sectors across 22 
countries from 1985 and 1990; data for 
some countries for both time points, in 
which case the average is used, and only 
from one of the years for the remainder
SO2 emissions Infant mortality rate; population density
Henderson (1997) Binary variable indicating whether an 
industry is located in a U.S. county or not
Five 3-digit U.S. SIC industries over 1978-
1987 for 742 urban counties
Ozone attainment status State fuel prices over 1978-1987; metro area manufacturing 
employment (except own industry) over 1978-1987; county 
and metro area total employment (except own industry) over 
1978-1987Table 2.  Determinants of Relative FDI: Pitt & Rosenzweig (1990) Approach.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Panel A.  Plant, Property, and Equipment
ln(RAC) -0.789* -4.720* -0.724* -4.657* -0.802* -3.437* -0.657* -3.535*
(0.155) (0.653) (0.146) (0.703) (0.142) (0.509) (0.151) (0.631)
ln(spatial RAC) -1.056* 0.930 0.596 0.977 0.148 7.210†
(0.349) (1.718) (0.498) (1.958) (0.576) (3.636)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 39.174 8.674 6.344 9.340
Overid Test 0.040 0.136 0.074 0.032
Endogeneity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563
Panel B.  Employment
ln(RAC) -0.498* -2.205* -0.447* -2.399* -0.494* -1.463* -0.584* -2.212*
(0.096) (0.304) (0.096) (0.339) (0.099) (0.308) (0.101) (0.346)
ln(spatial RAC) -0.758* 1.052 0.096 1.984† -0.546 2.421
(0.211) (0.869) (0.277) (0.929) (0.398) (1.903)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 38.003 13.256 10.666 10.037
Overid Test 0.834 0.210 0.172 0.164
Endogeneity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621
Spec (1) Spec (4) Spec (2) Spec (3)
Notes: ‡ p<0.10, † p<0.05, * p<0.01.  Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.  Dependent variable is chemical sector 
FDI minus all other manufacturing FDI.  RAC is relative abatement costs.  Other covariates included in Specification 1 
include: average production-worker wages, land prices, energy prices, total road mileage, unemployment rate, unionization 
rate, region dummies, and year dummies.  Specifications 2 - 4 also include spatial versions of these controls.  Specification 
2 uses contiguous weights; Specification 3 uses weights based on U.S. Census regions; Specification 4 uses weights based 
on Crone's (1998/1999) regions.  Excluded instruments are market proximity, population, and tax effort (Specifications 1 - 
4) and the spatial counterparts (Specifications 2 - 4).  Underid reports the p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk 
statistic with rejection implying identification; Overid reports the p-value of Hansen J statistic with rejection casting doubt 
on instruments' validity; Endog reports the p-value of endogeneity test of the endogenous regressors; Joint Sign. reports 
the p-value of Anderson-Rubin (1949) chi-square test of significance of the endogenous regressors; F-stat reports the 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic for weak identification.  See text for further details.Table 3.  Determinants of Relative FDI: Pitt & Rosenzweig - Type Falsification Test.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Panel A.  Plant, Property, and Equipment
ln(RAC) -0.509* 0.490 -0.346† -0.528 -0.294‡ 1.047* -0.573* 0.654
(0.153) (0.342) (0.151) (1.116) (0.156) (0.348) (0.166) (0.455)
ln(spatial RAC) 0.296 6.287 0.708 1.933 -0.313 1.306
(0.325) (5.431) (0.452) (1.814) (0.604) (2.045)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
F-stat 34.698 7.589 4.103 8.025
Overid Test 0.149 0.000 0.446 0.116
Endogeneity 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.011
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.001 0.079 0.052 0.000 0.016 0.008 0.002 0.119
N 469 469 469 469 469 469 469 469
Panel B.  Employment
ln(RAC) 0.156 0.099 0.069 -0.472 0.257† 0.642† 0.190 0.254
(0.117) (0.229) (0.113) (2.228) (0.116) (0.283) (0.130) (0.262)
ln(spatial RAC) 0.921* 7.805 1.071* 2.023† 0.752 2.050
(0.226) (8.739) (0.310) (0.980) (0.475) (1.350)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 34.627 10.226 9.067 10.627
Overid Test 0.525 0.000 0.000 0.358
Endogeneity 0.735 0.868 0.052 0.535
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.184 0.701 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.206 0.271
N 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546
Notes: ‡ p<0.10, † p<0.05, * p<0.01. Dependent variable is FDI in the food and kindred products sector minus all other 
manufacturing FDI except the chemical sector.  See Table 2 for further details.  
Spec (1) Spec (2) Spec (3) Spec (4)Table 4.  Determinants of Chemical Sector FDI: OLS, Lewbel (2010), and Klein & Vella (2009) Approaches. 
OLS IV CF OLS IV CF OLS IV CF OLS IV CF
Panel A.  Plant, Property, and Equipment
ln(RAC) -0.198† -0.558* -0.812 -0.199† -0.474† -0.946 -0.153 -0.544* -0.826 -0.222† -0.477† -0.801
(0.092) (0.195) (0.577) (0.092) (0.200) (0.586) (0.095) (0.192) (0.639) (0.098) (0.235) (0.702)
ln(spatial RAC) -0.264 -1.100 1.482 -0.313 -1.178* -2.383 0.323 0.235 0.366
(0.169) (0.755) (1.379) (0.208) (0.430) (1.702) (0.310) (1.174) (1.383)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 41.951 7.000 17.955 5.977
Overid Test 0.814 0.000 0.550 0.236
Endogeneity 0.036 0.332 0.027 0.389
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.033 0.030 0.159 0.023 0.000 0.376 0.128 0.022 0.198 0.018 0.056 0.149
N 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563
Panel B.  Employment
ln(RAC) -0.397* -0.802* -0.669 -0.386* -0.719* -0.663 -0.291* -0.687* -0.498 -0.379* -0.886* -0.457
(0.072) (0.135) (0.588) (0.072) (0.133) (0.584) (0.071) (0.136) (0.595) (0.077) (0.168) (0.691)
ln(spatial RAC) -0.343† -0.645‡ -0.189 -0.273‡ -0.824* -0.790 0.270 -0.591 -1.198
(0.134) (0.343) (0.733) (0.153) (0.305) (0.705) (0.254) (0.783) (1.045)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 68.248 16.340 23.233 9.851
Overid Test 0.137 0.001 0.138 0.710
Endogeneity 0.000 0.020 0.003 0.001
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.000 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.566
N 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621
Spec (1) Spec (2) Spec (3) Spec (4)
Notes: ‡ p<0.10, † p<0.05, * p<0.01.  Standard errors are in parentheses; CF standard errors are obtained via bootstrap.  'IV' refers to the Lewbel (2010) approach estimated via 
Limited Information Maximum Likelihood; 'CF' refers to the Klein and Vella (2009) control function approach.  Other covariates included in Specification 1 include: average 
production-worker wages, land prices, energy prices, total road mileage, unemployment rate, unionization rate, market proximity, population, tax effort, state dummies, and year 
dummies.  Specifications 2 - 4 also include spatial versions of these controls.  Excluded instruments in the IV estimations are market proximity, population, and tax effort 
demeaned and interacted with the first-stage residuals (Specification 1) and the spatial counterparts (Specifications 2 - 4).  Underid reports the p-value of the Anderson (1951) 
canonical correlation test with rejection implying identification; Overid reports the p-value of Anderson-Rubin (1950) statistic with rejection casting doubt on instruments' 
validity; Endog reports the p-value of endogeneity test of the endogenous regressors; Joint Sign. reports the p-value of Anderson-Rubin chi-square test of endogenous regressors; 
F-stat reports the Cragg and Donald (1993) F statistic for weak identification.  See Table 2 for further details.   Table 5.  Determinants of Total Manufacturing FDI: OLS, Lewbel (2010), and Klein & Vella (2009) Approaches. 
OLS IV CF OLS IV CF OLS IV CF OLS IV CF
Panel A.  Plant, Property, and Equipment
ln(RAC) -0.079‡ -0.155† -0.369 -0.082‡ -0.285* -0.472 -0.011 -0.021 -0.115 -0.086‡ -0.110 -0.251
(0.046) (0.073) (0.466) (0.047) (0.087) (0.356) (0.046) (0.074) (0.425) (0.048) (0.083) (0.342)
ln(spatial RAC) -0.126 -1.166* -0.902 -0.094 -0.198 0.577 0.181 0.690 -0.266
(0.096) (0.287) (1.021) (0.100) (0.201) (0.548) (0.159) (0.471) (0.935)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 137.812 15.194 34.614 14.245
Overid Test 0.758 0.363 0.082 0.814
Endogeneity 0.195 0.000 0.846 0.257
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.086 0.168 0.428 0.089 0.000 0.740 0.638 0.154 0.555 0.057 0.161 0.792
N 811 811 811 811 811 811 811 811 811 811 811 811
Panel B.  Employment
ln(RAC) -0.013 0.042 0.042 -0.027 0.019 -0.034 0.053 0.167* 0.489 -0.042 -0.008 0.160
(0.041) (0.065) (0.411) (0.041) (0.068) (0.553) (0.040) (0.063) (0.475) (0.043) (0.072) (0.401)
ln(spatial RAC) 0.039 -0.099 -0.310 -0.023 0.005 0.323 0.201 -0.027 -0.654
(0.086) (0.229) (0.475) (0.089) (0.173) (0.380) (0.144) (0.418) (0.609)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 147.699 17.159 37.330 14.560
Overid Test 0.714 0.165 0.437 0.918
Endogeneity 0.283 0.354 0.067 0.474
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.754 0.778 0.919 0.731 0.325 0.382 0.396 0.080 0.389 0.158 0.987 0.432
N 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814
Spec (1) Spec (2) Spec (3) Spec (4)
Notes: ‡ p<0.10, † p<0.05, * p<0.01.  See Table 4 for further details.Table 6.  Monte Carlo Results.
OLS PR - IV Lewbel - IV CF Traditional OLS PR - IV Lewbel - IV CF Traditional
IV IV
Coeff on Endogenous
   Regressor #1
     Bias 0.394 -0.008 -0.003 -0.025 -0.002 0.396 0.007 -0.003 -0.006 0.007
     Mean Absolute Error 0.394 0.100 0.033 0.051 0.070 0.396 0.042 0.014 0.022 0.025
     Root MSE 0.396 0.125 0.043 0.067 0.089 0.396 0.053 0.017 0.027 0.030
Coeff on Endogenous
   Regressor #2
     Bias -0.521 -0.005 0.003 0.030 -0.004 -0.522 0.006 0.002 0.010 -0.005
     Mean Absolute Error 0.521 0.099 0.035 0.058 0.070 0.522 0.042 0.013 0.024 0.028
     Root MSE 0.522 0.125 0.045 0.076 0.089 0.522 0.053 0.017 0.030 0.034
N = 5000 N = 750
Notes:  1000 simulations used when N = 750; 100 simulations used when N = 5000.  OLS = Ordinary Least Squares; PR-IV = Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) 
IV estimator; Lewbel-IV = Lewbel (2010) IV estimator; CF = Klein and Vella (2009) control function estimator; Traditional-IV = IV estimator based on 
usual exclusion restrictions.  MSE = Mean Squared Error.  See text for further details.Table 7.  Empirical Monte Carlo Results: Lewbel (2010) and Klein & Vella (2009) Approaches.
OLS Lewbel - IV CF OLS Lewbel - IV CF OLS Lewbel - IV CF
I.  PP&E: Chemical Sector
   ln(RAC)
     Bias 0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.008 0.003 0.000 -0.010
     MAE 0.039 0.071 0.110 0.036 0.081 0.111 0.043 0.078 0.103
     Root MSE 0.051 0.094 0.145 0.048 0.105 0.144 0.054 0.101 0.133
   ln(spatial RAC)
     Bias 0.000 0.018 0.016 0.002 0.021 0.032 0.001 -0.004 0.018
     MAE 0.060 0.168 0.236 0.051 0.096 0.158 0.117 0.344 0.379
     Root MSE 0.076 0.208 0.292 0.073 0.126 0.206 0.147 0.445 0.505
II.  PP&E: Total Manufacturing
   ln(RAC)
     Bias -0.005 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.007 -0.004 0.000 0.006
     MAE 0.023 0.036 0.049 0.019 0.033 0.051 0.022 0.039 0.046
     Root MSE 0.028 0.044 0.062 0.024 0.043 0.064 0.027 0.048 0.057
   ln(spatial RAC)
     Bias 0.003 -0.019 -0.023 -0.011 -0.018 -0.008 -0.004 0.009 -0.009
     MAE 0.040 0.109 0.130 0.034 0.060 0.083 0.065 0.204 0.221
     Root MSE 0.047 0.134 0.155 0.044 0.076 0.107 0.084 0.258 0.285
III.  Employment: Chemical Sector
   ln(RAC)
     Bias -0.006 -0.006 0.006 -0.005 -0.018 -0.019 0.004 0.008 -0.007
     MAE 0.028 0.048 0.066 0.024 0.057 0.079 0.032 0.064 0.085
     Root MSE 0.041 0.065 0.083 0.036 0.078 0.108 0.044 0.082 0.112
   ln(spatial RAC)
     Bias 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.014 -0.010 0.041 0.050
     MAE 0.049 0.137 0.143 0.046 0.093 0.138 0.110 0.337 0.286
     Root MSE 0.065 0.186 0.197 0.065 0.122 0.185 0.142 0.413 0.370
IV.  Employment: Total Manufacturing
   ln(RAC)
     Bias 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.006
     MAE 0.031 0.049 0.015 0.038 0.046 0.019 0.035 0.043 0.021
     Root MSE 0.048 0.069 0.029 0.056 0.068 0.032 0.054 0.063 0.035
   ln(spatial RAC)
     Bias -0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.014 -0.004
     MAE 0.090 0.085 0.030 0.057 0.087 0.036 0.203 0.197 0.067
     Root MSE 0.124 0.125 0.047 0.081 0.119 0.051 0.254 0.259 0.094
Notes:  100 simulations used, where ln(RAC) and ln(spatial RAC) are replaced by random draws from the empirical distribution of 
each variable.  RAC is relative abatement costs.  Specification 2 uses contiguous weights; Specification 3 uses weights based on 
U.S. Census regions; Specification 4 uses weights based on Crone's (1998/1999) regions.  MAE = Mean Absolute Error; MSE = 
Mean Squared Error.  See text and Table 6 for further details.
Spec (4) Spec (3) Spec (2)Table 8.  Empirical Monte Carlo Results: Pitt & Rosenzweig (1990) Approach.
I.  PP&E
   ln(RAC)
     Bias
     MAE
     Root MSE
   ln(spatial RAC)
     Bias
     MAE
     Root MSE
II.  Employment
   ln(RAC)
     Bias
     MAE
     Root MSE
   ln(spatial RAC)
     Bias
     MAE














Notes:  100 simulations used, where ln(RAC) and ln(spatial RAC) are replaced by random 
draws from the empirical distribution of each variable.  Dependent variable is chemical 
sector FDI minus all other manufacturing FDI.  MAE = Mean Absolute Error; MSE = Mean 
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The validity of existing empirical tests of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH) is constantly under
scrutiny due to two shortcomings. First, the issues of unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error
in environmental regulation are typically ignored due to the lack of a credible, traditional instrumental
variable. Second, while the recent literature has emphasized the importance of geographic spillovers in
determining the location choice of foreign investment, such spatial e￿ects have yet to be adequately in-
corporated into empirical tests of the PHH. As a result, the impact of environmental regulations on trade
patterns and the location decisions of multinational enterprises remains unclear. In this paper, we cir-
cumvent the lack of a traditional instrument within a model incorporating geographic spillovers utilizing
three novel identi￿cation strategies. Using state-level panel data on inbound U.S. FDI, relative abatement
costs, and other determinants of FDI, we consistently ￿nd (i) evidence of environmental regulation being
endogenous, (ii) a negative impact of own environmental regulation on inbound FDI in pollution-intensive
sectors, particularly when measured by employment, and (iii) larger e￿ects of environmental regulation
once endogeneity is addressed. Neighboring environmental regulation is not found to be an important
determinant of FDI.
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The precise relationship between environmental policy, the location of production, and subsequent trade
￿ows remains an open and hot-button issue. Of particular concern is the so-called Pollution Haven Hy-
pothesis (PHH), whereby a reduction in trade barriers enables polluting multinational enterprises (MNEs)
to outsource (at least some) production activities to areas with less stringent environmental regulation,
thereby altering both the spatial distribution of economic activity and subsequent trade patterns through
the creation of havens for polluting ￿rms. Kellenberg (2009, p. 242) states that \the empirical valid-
ity of pollution haven e￿ects continues to be one of the most contentious issues in the debate regarding
international trade, foreign investment, and the environment." Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004, p. 6)
characterize the debate as \particularly heated."
Proper examination of this relationship is crucial for several reasons. First, understanding determinants
of trade patterns and the spatial distribution of MNE activity is imperative in the current economic climate.
In particular, given the dramatic rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to trade volumes over the
past two decades, understanding the behavior of MNEs is critical. For example, global FDI in￿ows rose
from less than $600 billion in 2003 to roughly $2.1 trillion in 2007 in nominal terms (UNCTAD 2010).
Aggregate inbound FDI stocks rose from $2.1 trillion in 1990 to nearly $18 trillion in 2009 in nominal
terms (UNCTAD 2010). Moreover, the U.S. is the largest recipient of global FDI ￿ows, receiving $316
billion in FDI in￿ows in 2008, roughly $100 billion more than the next two largest hosts combined (Belgium
and China).
Second, if countries are able to attract (or deter) FDI by manipulating environmental regulations,
then international coordination may be necessary to avoid Pareto-ine￿cient levels of regulation due to
transboundary pollutions or other spillovers (e.g., Levinson 1997, 2003). Third, if countries are able to
in￿uence the location of MNE activity and ultimately trade patterns through environmental regulation,
then bringing environmental policies under the purview of trade agreements may be necessary to realize
the intended e￿ects of such agreements. Fourth, and related to this prior point, existing institutional
structures such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) may be used to impede countries from choosing
their desired environmental policies if such policies can be shown to impact trade ￿ows between members.
Finally, a detailed analysis of the PHH has broader implications for the general study of capital competition
(e.g., Wilson 1999).
Despite the high stakes, the existing literature has been unable to convincingly assess the empirical
validity of the PHH for three reasons. First, environmental regulation is complex and multidimensional,
making any empirical measure fraught with measurement error. Shadbegian and Wolverton (2010, p. 13)
1state: \Measuring the level of environmental stringency in any meaningful way is quite di￿cult, whether at
the national, state, or local level." The di￿culty arises from the fact that di￿erent regulations typically cover
di￿erent pollutants, regulations may exist at multiple levels (e.g., federal and local), and monitoring and
enforcement are imperfect. Along these lines, Levinson (2008, p. 1) states: \The problem is not merely
one of collecting the appropriate data; merely conceiving of data that would represent [environmental
stringency] is di￿cult." Xing and Kolstad (2002, p. 3) refer to the measurement of environmental regulation
as \no easy task" due to its \complexity." Moreover, depending on the empirical measure employed, the
measurement error need not be classical and any bias may be accentuated by the reliance on ￿xed e￿ects
methods in the recent literature.
Second, even if an accurate measure of environmental regulation is available, it may be endogenous for
other reasons (e.g., Levinson 2008; Levinson and Taylor 2008). For example, it may be correlated with
unobserved determinants of location choice such as tax breaks or other ￿rm-speci￿c treatments, the pro-
vision of other public goods in addition to environmental quality (e.g., infrastructure), agglomeration, the
stringency of other regulations such as occupational safety standards, corruption, local political activism,
political institutions, etc. (see Arauzo-Carod et al. (2010) for a review). In addition, reverse causation may
be an issue. For instance, anticipation of low FDI in￿ows may drive reductions in environmental stringency.
Or, an increase in FDI may increase the e￿cacy of industrial lobby groups (e.g., Cole et al. 2006; Cole
and Fredriksson 2009). Conversely, as Keller and Levinson (2002, p. 695) state: \Those states that do
not attract a lot of polluting manufacturing probably do not enact stringent regulations { there simply is
less need to worry about industrial pollution in states with less industrial activity, and those states that
do attract polluting manufacturing may respond by enacting more stringent regulation." Levinson (2010,
p. 63) summarizes these arguments succinctly: \International trade has environmental consequences, and
environmental policy can have international trade consequences."
Third, existing studies of the PHH inadequately incorporate geographic spillovers. Recent theoretical
models emphasize that the extent of MNE activity in one location depends not just on attributes of that
location, but also on the attributes of other potential hosts. Moreover, the predicted direction of the cross-
e￿ects is not always in the opposite direction of the own-e￿ects, a restriction that is implicit in discrete
choice models (e.g., Yeaple 2003; Ekholm et al. 2003; Grossman et al. 2003; Baltagi et al. 2007, 2008;
Blonigen et al. 2007, 2008; Arauzo-Carod et al. 2010). Failure to account for geographic spillovers in
empirical analyses of PHH may lead to biased inference. This may be particularly problematic in the
context of empirical analyses of inbound U.S. FDI since state-level environmental regulations have been
shown to be strongly related to the regulatory stringency of neighboring states (Fredriksson and Millimet
2002).
2While these shortcomings, particularly the ￿rst and second, are well known, convincing solutions have
proven elusive due to the di￿culty of ￿nding valid exclusion restrictions. In this paper, we simultaneously
address these three shortcomings while examining the spatial distribution of inbound U.S. manufacturing
FDI across the 48 contiguous states. Geographic spillovers are incorporated in an unrestricted manner by
including a spatially lagged counterpart for each state-level attribute. Measurement error, unobserved het-
erogeneity, and reverse causation concerns are then addressed utilizing three novel identi￿cation strategies
designed to circumvent the need to identify valid exclusion restrictions in the usual sense. As each does so
under a di￿erent set of assumptions, utilizing all three strategies enables us to assess the robustness of the
results to the identifying assumptions.
The ￿rst method generates instruments utilizing a di￿erencing strategy based on Pitt and Rosenzweig
(1990). The key identifying assumptions are that the marginal e￿ects of certain covariates are identical
across pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive sectors, and these covariates are signi￿cantly related
to environmental stringency. The second and third methods are based on identi￿cation strategies that
utilize higher moments of the data. Klein and Vella’s (2009, 2010) and Lewbel’s (2010) approaches each
exploit conditional second moments to circumvent the need for traditional instruments. Identi￿cation is
achieved in the Klein and Vella (2009, 2010) approach by assuming that while the errors are heteroskedastic,
the conditional correlation between the errors is constant. In the Lewbel (2010) approach, identi￿cation
is achieved through the presence of covariates related to the conditional variance of the ￿rst-stage errors,
but not the conditional covariance between ￿rst- and second-stage errors.
In addition to the application, we also undertake a small-scale Monte Carlo study. While the per-
formance of the estimators considered here have been evaluated previously using simulated data, to our
knowledge these evaluations have been con￿ned to the case of a single endogenous regressor. Here, we ver-
ify that each method extends to the case of multiple endogenous variables (as in our application). We also
undertake a so-called empirical Monte Carlo design based on Huber et al. (2010) that simulates placebo
values of the endogenous variables within the real data from our analysis.
The results are striking. In terms of the estimation approaches, we indeed verify that all three identi-
￿cation strategies perform well in settings with two endogenous variables. In addition, the performances
of the Klein and Vella (2009) and Lewbel (2010) approaches are comparable to the performance of a
traditional instrumental variable (IV) estimator when strong, valid exclusion restrictions are available.
In terms of the application, using state-level panel data, we consistently ￿nd (i) evidence of environ-
mental regulation being endogenous when examining the behavior of pollution-intensive industries, (ii) a
negative impact of own environmental stringency on inbound FDI in pollution-intensive sectors, particu-
larly when measured by employment, and (iii) signi￿cantly larger e￿ects of environmental regulation once
3endogeneity is addressed. Neighboring environmental regulation is not an important determinant of FDI
(although the estimates are relatively imprecise in the analysis and the empirical Monte Carlo study).
However, spillovers from other attributes are present (although not the focus of this study), indicating the
importance of incorporating spatial e￿ects more generally in models of FDI determination. Thus, while
not homogeneous (as in Henderson and Millimet (2007) and Ederington et al. (2005)), environmental reg-
ulation is a signi￿cant determinant of location choice by some MNEs at least at the regional level. As such,
policymakers should be concerned about the incentives for localities to set regulation at Pareto-ine￿cient
levels and governments to in￿uence trade patterns in highly pollution-intensive industries through the
strategic manipulation of environmental policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review, con-
centrating on prior studies attempting to address endogeneity concerns. Section 3 describes the empirical
methods, the data, and the results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The literature assessing the empirical validity of the PHH has yet to reach a consensus due to the numerous
complexities confronted by researchers.1 Levinson (2008) e￿ectively separates the literature into ￿rst and
second generation studies. The ￿rst generation encompasses cross-sectional studies treating environmental
regulation as exogenous. These studies typically found no statistically meaningful evidence in support of
the PHH (and sometimes found counter-intuitive e￿ects). The second generation predominantly encom-
passes panel data studies designed to remove unobserved heterogeneity invariant along some dimension
(most often time, but occasionally across sectors di￿erentiated by pollution intensity). Panel approaches,
however, require environmental regulation to be strictly exogenous conditional on the (typically time in-
variant) unobserved heterogeneity (and other covariates). A few studies within this second generation have
attempted to relax this assumption and utilize traditional IV approaches. These second generation studies
typically ￿nd economically and statistically signi￿cant evidence in support of the PHH.
As mentioned, it is unlikely that existing panel studies are su￿cient to yield unbiased estimates of
the impact of environmental regulation on the location of economic activity and/or subsequent trade
patterns. The omission of third-country e￿ects, the omission of variables that vary over time or di￿erentially
a￿ect pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive sectors such as tax breaks and agglomeration e￿ects,
measurement error in proxies for environmental regulation, and dependence between current environmental
regulation and past (or current) shocks to economic activity point strongly to violations of strict exogeneity
1See Ja￿e et al. (1995), Copeland and Taylor (2004), and Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) for reviews of the literature.
4(e.g., Henderson 1997; List et al. 2003; Cole and Fredriksson 2009).
Recognizing this, several studies test the PHH utilizing traditional exclusion restrictions. These studies
are summarized in Table 1. At the risk of over-simplifying the literature, the instruments used generally fall
within three categories. The ￿rst set includes lagged environmental regulation or lags of other covariates
(Cole and Elliott 2005; Jug and Mirza 2005; Ederington and Minier 2003). For such variables to represent
valid instruments, the error term should not be serially correlated, which may be particularly unrealistic
if measurement error is serially correlated or agglomeration e￿ects are not accurately modeled. Both are
distinct possibilities. Serial correlation in measurement error is likely due to the use of the same imperfect
proxy over time. Agglomeration e￿ects are not likely to be modeled perfectly given their complex nature
due to multiple origins (e.g., domestic versus foreign and within and across industries) and non-linearities
(Arauzo-Carod et al. 2010).
The second set includes instruments based on the geographic dispersion of industries (Levinson and
Taylor 2008; Cole et al. 2005; Ederington et al. 2004; List et al. 2003). Speci￿cally, the level of pollution
emitted by other industries in the locations where a given industry tends to locate is used to generate
instruments. For such variables to be valid instruments, the geographic distribution of industries must be
exogenous. However, as with the ￿rst set of instruments, these instruments are likely to be correlated with
the error term if agglomeration e￿ects are not accurately modeled. In fact, the instruments fail the Sargan
overidenti￿cation test at the p < 0:01 con￿dence level in Levinson and Taylor (2008). Similar instruments
do fare better in Cole et al. (2005).
The ￿nal set of instruments include a variety of contemporaneous, location-speci￿c attributes that are
hypothesized to impact environmental regulation but not directly impact ￿rm location decisions or trade
patterns. Examples range from economic variables such as attributes of the agricultural sector, per capita
income, and public expenditures to demographic variables such as urbanization, infant mortality, popula-
tion density, and schooling to political economy variables such as corruption, and proxies for industry lobby
bargaining power. Kellenberg (2009) also utilizes some spatially lagged covariates as exclusion restrictions.
Needless to say, one can plausibly argue in each case that such variables may also directly impact ￿rm
location or trade patterns, or be correlated with the error term due to non-classical measurement error or
omitted geographic spillovers, agglomeration e￿ects, or other sources of heterogeneity. Brunnermeier and
Levinson (2004, p. 37), reviewing the literature at the time, state that \as is always true of instrumental
variable analyses, the instruments are open to critique." That said, Kellenberg (2009) is noteworthy as the
instruments fare well in terms of the usual speci￿cation tests.
Despite the suspect validity of the identi￿cation strategies employed in these prior studies, rigorous
speci￿cation testing is noticeably absent in many. A few discuss the strength of the ￿rst-stage relationship
5and/or conduct Hausman-type tests for endogeneity, but most neglect to test or even discuss why the
proposed instruments should be exogenous or excluded from the second-stage equation for location choice
or trade patterns; Levinson and Taylor (2008) and Kellenberg (2009) are notable exceptions. Nonetheless,
these studies nearly universally obtain a more detrimental e￿ect of environmental regulation on the behavior
of pollution intensive sectors once endogeneity is (attempted to be) addressed. Given this background, we
now turn to our analysis.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Structural Model
To ￿x ideas, a typical model used to assess determinants of (continuous) measures of FDI stocks or ￿ows
with panel data is a standard two-way ￿xed e￿ects speci￿cation:
ln(FDIit) = ￿i + ￿t +
P
k ￿kxikt + ’it; (1)
where FDI is some measure of MNE activity in location i and time t, xk, k = 1;:::;K, are time-varying
observable attributes of location i, ￿i and ￿t are location and period ￿xed e￿ects, respectively, and ’it is
the error term. A proxy for environmental regulation is one element in x. As is well known, consistent
estimates of the parameters in (1) requires x to be strictly exogenous.
As discussed previously, the model in (1) is potentially ￿awed due to the exclusion of geographic
spillovers. The omission of spillovers is one reason why the strict exogeneity assumption may fail in
practice. Thus, we begin by augmenting (1) to include spatially lagged counterparts for each covariate:













j2￿ !ijtxjkt, ! is the weight given by location i to neighbor j in period t, ￿
includes the set of neighbors of location i, and "it is the new error term. Even if all elements in the regressors
in the augmented model are strictly exogenous, estimation of (2) is nonstandard given the introduction of
the weights, !. To proceed, the weights must be chosen a priori.
As is well known in these types of models, the choice of the weights is ad hoc; thus, the spatially lagged
variables are potentially measured with error. Prior to discussing the weighting schemes utilized, two
comments are warranted. First, if the weights are mis-speci￿ed, this would likely attenuate the estimates
of ￿k to zero, as we are essentially looking for evidence of spillovers in the wrong place. Thus, the estimates
should be interpreted as lower bounds (in absolute value). However, if we ￿nd evidence of geographic
6spillovers, then this is not particularly problematic. Second, as discussed below, since we are treating
own and neighboring environmental regulation as endogenous, we are able to recover consistent estimates
(under the assumptions of the estimators utilized) of neighboring environmental regulation as long as the
signal-noise ratio is not negligible.
That said, we utilize three straightforward weighting schemes. First, we assign a weight of zero to
non-contiguous neighbors and equal weights to all contiguous neighbors. In other words,
P
j !ijtxjkt
simpli￿es to the mean of xjkt in neighboring states. Second, following Fredriksson and Millimet (2002),
we adopt two regional breakdowns for the 48 mainland U.S. states (see Appendix A). The use of regional
weights is also motivated by the evidence in Glick and Woodward (1987) that foreign-owned a￿liates in
manufacturing tend to serve regional markets. For each regional breakdown,
P
j !ijtxjkt simpli￿es to the
mean of xjkt in all other neighbors within the same region (again, giving each regional neighbor equal
weight). The two regional classi￿cations come from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and
Crone (1998/1999). The BEA regional classi￿cation system was introduced in the 1950s and has never
been amended. While this classi￿cation system is widely used by economists in studying regional economic
activity, Crone (1998/1999) devised an alternative regional breakdown for U.S. states using cluster analysis
to group states according to similarities in economic activity. We refer to these weighting schemes as BEA
and Crone regional weights, respectively.
Even with speci￿cation of the weights, estimation of (2) is complicated by the fact that own and
neighboring environmental regulation are likely correlated with the error term, ", due to measurement
error, spatial error correlation, unobserved heterogeneity, and/or reverse causation. Thus, traditional ￿xed
e￿ects estimates are not likely to yield consistent estimates of ￿ and ￿. Before discussing our approach to
identi￿cation, we brie￿y discuss the structure of the data as this will make the empirical approaches easier
to document. We then present each estimation method along with its results.
3.2 Data
The data come directly from Keller and Levinson (2002); thus, we provide only limited details. Summary
statistics are provided in the Appendix. The data cover the 48 contiguous U.S. states from 1977 { 1994,
omitting 1987 due to missing data on abatement costs. The measures of FDI include the value of gross
property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) of foreign-owned a￿liates for all manufacturers, as well as just
for the chemical sector (1992 { 1994 omitted), and employment at foreign-owned a￿liates for all manu-
facturers, as well as just for the chemical sector (1992 { 1994 omitted).2 The chemical sector (SIC 28) is
2For each dependent variable, the sample represents an unbalanced panel where the number of observations for total
manufacturing PP&E (employment) are 811 (814); for chemical sector PP&E (employment), the sample size is 563 (621).
7analyzed in isolation given that FDI in these industries is most likely to be responsive to spatial variation
in environmental stringency given the pollution-intensive nature of production (Ederington et al. 2005).
Consistent with ￿gures reported elsewhere, inbound FDI stocks increased tremendously over the sample
period. Aggregate manufacturing PP&E increased over tenfold from 1977 to 1994, from roughly $20 million
to nearly $300 million (in 1982 US$). An increase of similar proportion occurred in the chemical sector from
1977 to 1991, from roughly $10 million to $90 million. Employment grew at a slower, but still substantial,
rate, increasing from roughly 675,000 to almost 2.3 million in aggregate manufacturing; 190,000 to 500,000
in the chemical sector.
In the theoretical model of inbound FDI presented in Blonigen et al. (2008), determinants of FDI
include trade costs, cost and demand shifters, and parent country attributes. Here, total road mileage
and state e￿ects capture time-varying and time invariant (e.g., distance to ports) di￿erences in trade costs
across states. Population and market proximity (a distance-weighted average of all other states’ gross state
products) re￿ect market size and demand shocks. Relative abatement costs (RAC), unemployment rate,
unionization rate, average production-worker wages across the state, land prices, energy prices, and tax
e￿ort (actual tax revenues divided by those that would be collected by a model tax code, as calculated by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations) capture variation in production costs and resource
availability. RAC is the proxy for environmental regulation. This measure is attributable to Levinson
(2001) and represents the ratio of actual state-level abatement costs to predicted state-level abatement
costs, where the predicted value is based on the industrial composition of the state. Consequently, higher
values indicate relatively more stringent environmental protection. The index varies over time and across
states. Finally, since FDI is aggregated across all countries outside the U.S., time e￿ects capture parent
country attributes. All variables are expressed in logarithmic form with the exception of the unemployment
and unionization rates. In addition, we form the spatially lagged variables ￿rst and then take logs, again
with the exception of spatially lagged unemployment and unionization rates.
Prior to continuing, it is important to note that the Spearman rank correlation between RAC and
total manufacturing FDI as measured by PP&E is positive (￿ = 0:11, p = 0:003); the correlation is even
stronger when only considering the chemical sector (￿ = 0:13; p = 0:001). Neither correlation is statistically
signi￿cant using employment to measure FDI. Moreover, as shown in Keller and Levinson (2002), total
manufacturing FDI as measured by employment (and PP&E) increased by more over the sample period in
the 20 states experiencing the largest increase in RAC than in the 20 states experiencing the largest decline
in RAC. In addition, Table A1 in the Appendix shows that mean total manufacturing FDI as measured
by PP&E is higher when RAC exceeds one (indicating more stringent environmental regulation), as well
as for the chemical and non-chemical sectors considered separately. However, mean total manufacturing
8employment, as well as in the chemical and non-chemical sectors, is lower in states with RAC greater than
one. In any event, ￿nding statistical evidence consistent with the PHH, particularly using data on PP&E,
would appear to require the existence of signi￿cant selection (on either observed or unobserved variables)
into more stringent RAC.
3.3 Estimation
3.3.1 Pitt & Rosenzweig (1990) Approach
Model The ￿rst identi￿cation strategy used to address the potential endogeneity of own and spatially
lagged environmental regulation is based on the approach put forth in Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990). Pitt
and Rosenzweig (1990) are concerned with the impact of an endogenous household-level variable on chil-
dren di￿erentiated by gender. Lacking a traditional exclusion restriction, the solution proposed entails
examining the di￿erential e￿ect of the endogenous variable on sons versus daughters and generating exclu-
sion restrictions by assuming that some exogenous household-level covariates have identical e￿ects on boys
and girls. In our application, we apply this logic to assess the di￿erential e￿ect of own and spatially lagged
environmental regulation on two types of FDI: FDI in pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive sec-
tors. Valid exclusion restrictions are generated by assuming that some exogenous state-level covariates
have equal e￿ects on FDI across these two sectors.
Formally, we re-write the structural model in (2) separately for pollution-intensive (P) manufacturing



























































where K1 +K2 = K. Thus, x1 includes a subset of x for which the marginal e￿ects on FDI are allowed to
di￿er depending on the pollution intensity of the industry. The marginal e￿ects of covariates included in
x2 are assumed to be constant across sectors (and thus lack a p or np superscript). In the analysis, we take
the chemical sector as the pollution-intensive sector and all other manufacturing sectors as the (relatively)
non-pollution-intensive sector (e.g., Xing and Kolstad 2002; Wagner and Timmins 2009). While there are
9certainly other data partitions one may try (conditional on data availability), results based on treating
only the chemical sector as pollution-intensive should yield evidence of the PHH if it exists.
Subtracting (4) from (3) in each time period yields


















In (5) x2ikt and
P
j2￿ !ijtx2jkt, k = 1;:::;K2, are available as exclusion restrictions.3





2 = ￿2. If the restrictions imposed lead to an overidenti￿ed model (i.e., there are at least
two variables in x2), then the usual overidenti￿cation test constitutes a test of the restrictions imposed.
To see this, note that if ￿2k or ￿2k does in fact di￿er across sectors di￿erentiated by pollution intensity,
then the error term in (5) will contain terms such as ￿￿2kx2ikt or ￿￿2k
P48
j=1 !ijtx2jkt and the resulting
instruments will be correlated with the error.
While this approach aids in the generation of instruments for environmental regulation, it does so at
a cost (even if the restrictions are valid). Speci￿cally, the approach only provides consistent estimates





1 equal zero, this approach only identi￿es the di￿erential e￿ects of the (own and spatially
lagged) covariates in x1 on inbound FDI in pollution-intensive relative to non-pollution-intensive sectors.




1 corresponding to own and
spatially lagged environmental regulation are zero, this is unlikely to be the case. On the one hand, our
de￿nition of the non-pollution-intensive sector still includes some polluting industries since it aggregates all
manufacturing sectors except the chemical sector. On the other hand, when treating environmental regula-
tion as exogenous and ignoring geographic spillovers, Henderson and Millimet (2007) obtain some positive
and statistically meaningful nonparametric regression estimates of the association between environmental
regulation and inbound U.S. FDI. Similarly, Mulatu et al. (2010) obtain a statistically insigni￿cant, but
positive e￿ect of environmental stringency on production shares in the least pollution-intensive sectors.





3Note, this approach is similar to the strategy employed in Wagner and Timmins (2009). However, in that study, the
authors assume that environmental regulation is exogenous in their analog to the di￿erenced equation given by (5). Thus, their
identi￿cation strategy requires no location-speci￿c unobservables be correlated with environmental regulation, but di￿erentially
associated with investment across sectors by pollution intensity. As shown below, this assumption is rejected in our data.
10Results The results are presented in Panels A (PP&E) and B (employment) in Table 2. The speci￿cations
estimated correspond to (5) except that the di￿erenced state ￿xed e￿ects, e ￿i, are replaced with region
dummies. Thus, we are assuming that time invariant attributes that di￿erentially a￿ect sectors according
to their pollution intensity are constant within regions. Estimation is performed using ordinary least squares
(OLS) and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) which has been shown to perform relatively
well in small samples with weaker instruments (e.g., Stock et al. 2002; Flores-Lagunes 2007). The variables
in x2 include market proximity, population, and tax e￿ort as such variables should be equally relevant to all
manufacturing industries. Four speci￿cations are estimated. Speci￿cation 1 omits all geographic spillovers.
Speci￿cations 2-4 include such spillovers, where Speci￿cation 2 uses the contiguous weighting scheme and
Speci￿cations 3 and 4 use the BEA and Crone regional weighting schemes, respectively. Finally, note that
we only display the point estimates for own and neighboring environmental regulation to conserve space.
Full estimation results are available upon request.
Turning to the results, four ￿ndings emerge. First, the OLS estimates are negative and statistically
signi￿cant, as well as signi￿cantly larger in magnitude than the estimates reported in Keller and Levinson
(2002). This di￿erence follows from a change in the de￿nition of the dependent variable, as well as
the fact that the model in (5) eliminates time-varying unobservables that are correlated with both FDI
and environmental regulation, but a￿ect FDI equally across sectors (e.g., local macroeconomic shocks
or political corruption). In addition, the OLS estimates are fairly stable across the four speci￿cations;
neighboring environmental regulation is statistically signi￿cant only in Speci￿cation 2.
Second, the identi￿cation strategy works well as determined by the usual IV speci￿cation tests, partic-
ularly when using employment to measure FDI. Speci￿cally, we reject the null that the model is underi-
denti￿ed at the p < 0:01 con￿dence level in every case using Kleibergen and Paap’s (2006) rk statistic, and
the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F-statistic is reasonably large. In addition, we fail to reject the validity of
the instruments using Hansen’s overidenti￿cation test in all cases when using employment to measure FDI,
and in Speci￿cations 2 and 3 in Panel A at the p < 0:05 con￿dence level. Thus, the Pitt and Rosenzweig
(1990) approach fares well in the current application. Third, in both panels, we reject exogeneity of own
environmental regulation in Speci￿cation 1 and own and neighboring environmental regulation in Speci￿ca-
tions 2-4. Thus, strict exogeneity of own and spatially lagged environmental regulation is overwhelmingly
rejected.
Finally, the LIML estimates are statistically signi￿cant at the p < 0:01 con￿dence level using either the
traditional approach or the Anderson and Rubin (1949) test robust to weak instruments. Moreover, the
point estimates are considerably larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates in absolute value; however,
the standard errors are also roughly four to ￿ve times larger. Neighboring environmental regulation is
11rarely statistically signi￿cant although the estimates are very imprecise.
While the point estimates for own environmental regulation are economically large, and we will return
to the issue of precision later, it helps to put the magnitude in context since the dependent variable is
now the log di￿erence in pollution-intensive and non-pollution-intensive FDI. For example, consider the
results in Panel B, Speci￿cation 1. Ohio in 1991 had 17,600 (104,900) workers in foreign-owned a￿liates
in the chemical sector (all other manufacturing sectors); thus, relative employment in the chemical sector
was 16.8%. The value of its RAC index was 0.86, making it a fairly lax state according to the index. The
ceteris paribus e￿ect of Ohio increasing its RAC at the time to match California (1.00) would have been
a decline in relative employment in the chemical sector to 10.8%. In contrast, the OLS estimate implies
a decline to only 15.4%. What is not known is how much of this change is due to a relative decline in
employment in the pollution-intensive sector and how much is due to a relative increase in employment in
the non-pollution-intensive sector. As stated previously, Henderson and Millimet (2007) ￿nd heterogeneous,
and often positive, associations between own environmental regulation and total manufacturing FDI when
treating regulation as exogenous.
Before turning to the next identi￿cation strategy, we attempt a (partial) falsi￿cation test of the Pitt and
Rosenzweig (1990) approach in the current context. Speci￿cally, we exclude the food and kindred products
industry (SIC 20) from our original de￿nition of the non-pollution-intensive sector (all manufacturing
except the chemical industry) and treat this as our pollution-intensive sector. Our new de￿nition of the
non-pollution-intensive sector is all manufacturing industries except the chemical sector and the food and
kindred products sector. Thus, we are attempting to compare two relatively non-pollution-intensive sectors
by (incorrectly) treating the food and kindred products sector as pollution-intensive. As a result, if the
identi￿cation strategy is valid and food and kindred products really is no more pollution-intensive than the
average (non-chemical) manufacturing industry, we would expect to ￿nd statistically insigni￿cant e￿ects
of own and neighboring environmental regulation.
The results are presented in Table 3.4 Of the eight models estimated using LIML, the instruments
pass the overidenti￿cation test in ￿ve. In these ￿ve models, only one of eight coe￿cient estimates related
to own or neighboring environmental regulation is statistically signi￿cant at even the p < 0:10 con￿dence
level. This is only marginally greater than is to be expected by chance. Thus, we interpret this as evidence
in favor of the identi￿cation strategy.
4Note, the number of observations di￿ers from Table 2 due missing data on FDI in the food and kindred products sector.
123.3.2 Lewbel (2010) Approach
Model The next two identi￿cation strategies used to address the potential endogeneity of own and
neighboring environmental regulation exploit the conditional second moments of the endogenous variables.
Lewbel (2010) complements earlier work by Vella and Verbeek (1997), Lewbel (1997), Rigobon (2003), and
Ebbes et al. (2004) and, as in the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, generates instruments that are
valid under certain assumptions.
To proceed, we re-write the FDI equation given in (2) together with the ￿rst-stage speci￿cations for
own and neighboring environmental regulation to make matters explicit. The system of equations is
ln(FDIit) = Xit￿ + ￿ ln(RACit) + ￿ ln(
P
j2￿ !ijtRACjt) + "it (6)
ln(RACit) = Xit￿1 + ￿1it (7)
ln(
P
j2￿ !ijtRACjt) = Xit￿2 + ￿2it; (8)
where RAC is the measure of relative abatement costs, X includes all the other regressors from x in (2)
except RAC (i.e., including the spatial terms and the state and time ￿xed e￿ects), and ￿1 and ￿2 are
the error terms in the ￿rst-stage equations assumed to be correlated with ". As stated, the model is not
identi￿ed since there are no exclusion restrictions in (7) and (8). However, Lewbel (2010) shows that if ￿1
and ￿2 are heteroskedastic and at least a subset of the elements of X are correlated with the error variances
but not with the error covariances, then the model is identi￿ed.
Formally, the Lewbel (2010) approach entails choosing zr ￿ X such that
E[z0
r￿2
r] 6= 0 (9)
E[z0
r"￿r] = 0 (10)
for r = 1;2. If these assumptions are satis￿ed, then e zr ￿ (zr ￿ z)￿r, r = 1;2, are valid instruments. If
the errors contain a common (homoskedastic) factor, along with heteroskedastic idiosyncratic components
(where the heteroskedasticity of ￿r depends on zr), then these assumptions will be satis￿ed. Formally, if
we can re-write the errors in (6) { (8) as
"it ￿ ￿it + e "it
￿rit ￿ ￿it + e ￿rit; r = 1;2;
where ￿ is homoskedastic, e ￿r, r = 1;2, is heteroskedastic (with variance depending on zr), and e ￿r,
r = 1;2, and e " are independent of each other and ￿, then (9) and (10) are satis￿ed. This data-generating
13process (DGP) is plausible if ￿ represents homoskedastic measurement error in environmental stringency,
or a composite index of unobserved variables impacting both environmental stringency and FDI (such
as those discussed previously) is drawn from an identical distribution across observations. However, the
idiosyncratic shocks to environmental stringency may be drawn from di￿erent distributions.
In the analysis, we use the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity to identify variables signi￿cantly
related to the ￿rst-stage error variances. We include land prices, total road mileage, and market proximity
in z1; the spatially-lagged counterparts are included in z2. The instruments, e zr, are then created by
replacing ￿r with its estimate obtained from (consistent) OLS estimates of the ￿rst-stage. See Appendix
B for further estimation details.
Prior to continuing, it is interesting to note { with further examination { that land prices and total road
mileage are associated with a lower variance of ￿1; neighboring land prices and total road mileage (market
proximity) are associated with a lower (higher) variance of ￿2. In Keller and Levinson (2002), land prices
and total road mileage are negatively associated with FDI in￿ows, whereas market proximity is positively
related. Thus, the pattern of heteroskedasticity is consistent with the notion that states with less favorable
attributes for attracting FDI minimize the volatility in another attribute, environmental stringency, that
may adversely impact inbound FDI.
Results The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5, where the di￿erent panels and speci￿cations are
identical to Tables 2 and 3. Table 4 contains the results for the chemical sector only; Table 5 assesses total
manufacturing. In the tables, the OLS estimates are presented for comparison, where the Speci￿cation
1 results are identical to Keller and Levinson (2002). The estimates obtained using the Lewbel (2010)
approach are given under the column labelled ‘IV’.
As with the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, four salient ￿ndings emerge. First, the OLS es-
timates are negative and statistically signi￿cant in the vast majority of cases. The main exception is
when examining FDI as measured by employment in total manufacturing (Panel B, Table 5). In addition,
the OLS estimates are fairly stable across the four speci￿cations; neighboring environmental regulation is
statistically signi￿cant only in Speci￿cations 2 and 3 when assessing employment in the chemical sector
(Panel B, Table 4). Inclusion of the spatial e￿ects has little e￿ect on the estimated marginal e￿ect of own
environmental regulation.
Second, as with the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, the Lewbel (2010) identi￿cation strategy
works well as determined by the usual IV speci￿cation tests when geographic spillovers are omitted (Spec-
i￿cation 1) as well as in the majority of cases when spatial e￿ects are included (particularly when using
14the two regional weighting schemes in Speci￿cations 3 and 4).5 Speci￿cally, we reject the null that the
model is underidenti￿ed at the p < 0:01 con￿dence level in every case using Anderson’s (1951) canonical
correlation test, and the Cragg and Donald (1993) F-statistic is reasonably large. In addition, we fail to
reject the validity of the instruments using Anderson and Rubin’s (1950) overidenti￿cation test in all cases
but one at the p < 0:10 con￿dence level for Speci￿cations 1, 3, and 4. In addition, Speci￿cation 2 fares well
in terms of these tests when examining total manufacturing. Thus, the Lewbel (2010) approach performs
well.
Third, when focusing on the cases that pass the speci￿cation tests, we reject exogeneity of own (and
neighboring) environmental regulation in the majority of cases for the chemical sector. There is much
less support for endogeneity when examining total manufacturing. Thus, there is only strong evidence of
endogeneity when focusing on the most pollution-intensive sectors.
Finally, turning to the point estimates in the cases that pass the speci￿cation tests for the chemical
sector (Table 4), the LIML estimates are statistically signi￿cant at at least the p < 0:10 con￿dence level
using either the traditional approach or the Anderson and Rubin (1949) test robust to weak instruments;
often statistically signi￿cant at the p < 0:01 con￿dence level. Moreover, as with the Pitt and Rosenzweig
(1990) approach, the point estimates are larger in absolute value compared to OLS; however, the standard
errors are also roughly two to three times larger. Neighboring environmental regulation is statistically
signi￿cant in Speci￿cation 3, but not Speci￿cation 4. Thus, choice of weighting scheme does matter in
meaningful ways.
To put the magnitude of the e￿ects in context, we return to the previous thought experiment. Using
the results in Panel B, Speci￿cation 4, if Ohio in 1991 had raised the value of its RAC index from 0.86
to match California (1.00), then employment in foreign-owned a￿liates in the chemical sector would have
been expected to decline from 17,600 to roughly 15,100. In contrast, the OLS estimate implies a decline
to only about 16,500.
In terms of the total manufacturing results (Table 5), we often fail to reject exogeneity as noted
previously. Moreover, adding the spatial e￿ects has little in￿uence on the estimates from Keller and
Levinson (2002); Kellenberg (2009) obtains a similar ￿nding. One noteworthy ￿nding, however, occurs in
Speci￿cation 3 when examining employment (Panel B). Here, we do reject exogeneity and the IV point
estimate indicates a positive and statistically signi￿cant e￿ect of own environmental regulation. While
we are cautious about putting too much stock in any one estimate given the number of speci￿cations
estimated, this is consistent with the heterogeneous e￿ects documented elsewhere in the prior literature
5Note, for computational reasons, we follow Keller and Levinson (2002) and do not present robust standard errors here; in
several speci￿cations, the robust estimate of the covariance matrix was not of full rank.
15(e.g., Henderson and Millimet 2007). In particular, this result and the prior results for the chemical sector
only highlight the fact that the impact of environmental regulation (as well as its statistical properties)
depends on the pollution intensity of the industry, consistent with existing studies (e.g., Ederington et al.
2005; Jug and Mirza 2005; Mulatu et al. 2010).
3.3.3 Klein & Vella (2009) Approach
Model The ￿nal identi￿cation strategy is based on the parametric implementation of the estimator
proposed in Klein and Vella (2009, 2010) and expanded upon in Farr￿ e et al. (2010). To proceed, consider
the system of equations given in (6) { (8). In addition to being mean zero, the following assumptions are




rit; r = 1;2 (12)
S"(zit)=Sr(zit); r = 1;2; varies across i (13)
E["￿
it￿￿
rit] = ￿r; r = 1;2 (14)
where "￿
it and ￿￿
rit are homoskedastic errors and z ￿ X. Thus, at least some of the errors are required to be
heteroskedastic in such a way that the ratio S"(zit)=Sr(zit), r = 1;2; varies across observations. However,
the conditional correlation, ￿r, r = 1;2, between the underlying homoskedastic portion of the errors must
be ￿xed. Note, while the three heteroskedasticity terms { S"(zit) and Sr(zit), r = 1;2 { are written as a
function of the same set of covariates, z, this need not be the case. There are no restrictions on which
variables may enter each of these terms.
Klein and Vella (2010) give some examples of DGPs satisfying these assumptions. One such case arises
if there exists a common factor, as in the Lewbel (2010) approach. However, here the common factor enters
multiplicatively and may itself be heteroskedastic. Speci￿cally, if we can write the errors as
"it = S"(zit)￿ite "it
￿rit = Sr(zit)￿ite ￿rit; r = 1;2
where e " and e ￿r are mean-zero, independent of X and ￿, and have a constant correlation given by ￿r, then
(11) { (14) are satis￿ed.
Reverting back to (14), it is worth considering what this identi￿cation condition implies. One possible
interpretation includes viewing "￿
it and ￿￿
rit, r = 1;2, as correlated measures of agglomeration. Agglomera-
tion may a￿ect environmental stringency due to the scale e￿ect of pollution-generating activity. However,
16the impact may depend on state-level attributes, zit. For instance, states with attributes that are not con-
ducive to attracting FDI may limit the impact of agglomeration on environmental stringency. Similarly,
own agglomeration may impact FDI through economies of scale, but the e￿ect may depend on state-level
attributes as well. Neighboring agglomeration may adversely impact FDI by improving the desirability of
neighboring locations. However, once we condition on these state-level attributes, the return to own and
neighboring agglomeration, ￿1 and ￿2, respectively, are constant. While not testable, this seems plausible.






exp(zrit￿r); r = 1;2 (16)
where z1 (z2) includes own (spatially lagged) land prices, total road mileage, and market proximity (as
in the Lewbel (2010) approach). Using the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity to identify variables
likely to be related to the structural error variance in the FDI equations, we include average production
worker wages, population, and market proximity in z" when examining FDI in the chemical sector; market
proximity only is included when examining total manufacturing FDI.6
With this setup, (6) may be rewritten as
ln(FDIit) = Xit￿ + ￿ ln(RACit) + ￿ ln(
P












S2(zit)￿2it is a control function and e e "it is a well-behaved error term. Given the
functional form assumptions in (15) and (16), (17) can be estimated by nonlinear least squares (NLS) in
a number of ways. Standard errors are obtained via bootstrap. See Appendix B for further estimation
details.
Results The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 under the column labelled ‘CF’. In Table 4 (chemical
sector), the point estimates are fairly stable across the four speci￿cations, particularly in Panel A (PP&E)
and especially when one considers the size of the standard errors.7 Moreover, while the coe￿cients on
own environmental regulation are roughly similar to those obtained using the Lewbel (2010) approach,
they are never statistically signi￿cant at the p < 0:10 con￿dence level due to the relatively large standard
errors. Neighboring environmental regulation is also never statistically signi￿cant (although the estimates
6Average production wages and population are excluded when examining total manufacturing FDI due to problems with
convergence.
7Standard errors are obtaining using 1000 bootstrap repititions.
17are even more imprecise) and inclusion of the spatial e￿ects has little in￿uence on the estimated marginal
e￿ects of own environmental regulation.
In terms of total manufacturing (Table 5), the results are consistent with the OLS and Lewbel (2010)
approaches, particularly when considering the size of the standard errors. Thus, there is no statistically
meaningful evidence of a negative impact of own environmental regulation, or of neighboring environmental
regulation, on FDI in￿ows across the manufacturing sector as a whole.
In sum, the three identi￿cation strategies provide a consistent picture: own environmental regulation
has an economically signi￿cant e￿ect on the spatial distribution of FDI in￿ows in pollution-intensive sectors
across U.S. states. However, there is little impact of environmental regulation on the location choice of
manufacturing FDI as a whole. The estimates are statistically meaningful when using the Lewbel (2010)
or Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach. Moreover, controlling for endogeneity, although not spatial
e￿ects, is crucial in empirical analyses of the PHH. All three estimators indicate much larger (but less
precisely estimated) e￿ects on FDI in￿ows in pollution-intensive sectors than suggested by traditional panel
data estimates. The downward (in absolute value) bias of OLS estimates may be attributable in part to
measurement error and in part to unobservables positively correlated with both environmental regulation
and FDI in￿ows. For instance, Becker (2011) ￿nds that there is signi￿cant variation in environmental
compliance costs across counties within states; roughly one-third of counties di￿er signi￿cantly from their
state average. Thus, signi￿cant attenuation bias due to measurement error is clearly plausible. Similarly, a
multitude of unobservables (such as investments in other public goods or agglomeration e￿ects) as well as
omitted within-state variation in the observables included in the analysis, can explain the bias in estimates
obtained under the assumption of strict exogeneity.
3.4 Monte Carlo Study
Prior to concluding, we undertake two small-scale Monte Carlo experiments for two reasons. First, given
that the identi￿cation strategies utilized herein are somewhat unorthodox, it is worthwhile to illustrate their
performance using simulated data. Second, as stated in the Introduction, existing analyses or applications
of these methods focus nearly exclusively on the case of a single endogenous regressor; we verify that each
method extends to the case of two endogenous variables. Note, however, due to the usual limitation of
Monte Carlo evidence { the fact that results may be speci￿c to the DGPs considered { our aim is not to
set up a ‘horse-race’ between the di￿erent approaches. Rather, our aim is simply to verify the performance
of each approach in a setting where the identifying assumptions hold.
18The ￿rst Monte Carlo design is based on the following data-generating process:
Outcomes: yp = 0:5 + 0:5x1 + 0:5x2 ￿ R1 + R2 + "p
ynp = 0:25 + 0:5x1 + 0:5x2 + "np
First-Stage : R1 = 1 + 0:25x1 ￿ 0:75x2 + ￿1
R2 = 1 ￿ 0:75x1 + 0:25x2 + ￿2
Covariates : x1;x2
iid ￿ N (0;1)
Errors : "p = S"(x)"￿
￿r = Sr(x)￿￿










































where R1 and R2 are the two endogenous covariates, yp is the outcome used to assess the performance of
the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009) approaches, and yp ￿ ynp is the di￿erenced outcome used
to assess the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach where the (correct) assumption that x1 and x2 have
identical e￿ects is used to identify the model. Thus, the true parameters of interest are -1 and 1 for all three
estimators. Finally, note that (x2 ￿x2)￿1 and (x1 ￿x1)￿2 satisfy the requirements for valid instruments in
the Lewbel (2010) approach, while the error structure also satis￿es the setup in the Klein and Vella (2009)
approach.
We perform this exercise twice; once using 1000 simulations of sample size 750 (roughly the size in
our application) and once using 100 simulations of sample size 5,000. For comparison, we also simulate
analogous data sets with traditional exclusion restrictions. In this case, the ￿rst-stage data-generating
process becomes
First-Stage : R1 = 1 + 0:25x1 ￿ 0:75x2 + 0:75z1 + 0:25z2 + ￿1
R2 = 1 ￿ 0:75x1 + 0:25x2 + 0:25z1 + 0:75z2 + ￿2
where z1;z2
iid ￿ N (0;1). The remainder of the data-generating process is unaltered. As in the Pitt and
Rosenzweig (1990) and Lewbel (2010) approaches, we obtain the traditional IV results using LIML.
19The results are presented in Table 6; OLS results are also included for comparison. The simulations
indicate that all three (non-OLS, non-traditional IV) estimators perform well overall and similarly to
traditional IV. In the small sample, the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) and Lewbel (2010) approaches are
superior in terms of bias (along with traditional IV); Lewbel (2010) yields the lowest mean absolute error
(MAE) and root mean squared error (RMSE) followed closely by and Klein and Vella (2009) and traditional
IV. Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) has a MAE and RMSE substantially larger than the other three (non-
OLS) estimators despite having an average bias near zero. In large samples, all four (non-OLS) estimators
perform very well, with both the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009) approaches matching the
performance of traditional IV.
The second Monte Carlo design is a so-called empirical Monte Carlo study, developed in Huber et
al. (2010). The authors \... suggest a di￿erent approach of conducting simulations ... using the real
data to simulate realistic ‘placebo treatments’ among the non-treated" (p. 3). In their application, since
the focus is on the performance of several estimators of the e￿ect of a binary regressor, the simulations
entail restricting the sample to only those observations for whom their actual value of the regressor is zero,
arbitrarily recoding the regressor to one for a subset of this sample, and then estimating the e￿ect of the
simulated binary regressor. In light of this setup, the ‘true’ e￿ect of the simulated regressor is zero.
In our application, the process is a bit more complex for three reasons: (i) there are two variables of
interest, (ii) the variables of interest are continuous, and (iii) our estimators require modeling the simulated
variable in a particular way for identi￿cation. To proceed, we use the following algorithm:
1. For each observation i, i = 1;:::;NT, in the real data, simulate a value for RAC by drawing a value
from its empirical distribution. In practice, this entails drawing a random number, s, between 1 and
NT and de￿ning the simulated value of RAC for observation i as the value of RAC from observation
s.
2. For each observation i, i = 1;:::;NT, in the real data, simulate a value for neighboring RAC by
drawing a value from its empirical distribution following the procedure in step 1.
3. Because we need the variables in x2 to be correlated with own and neighboring RAC in the Pitt
and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, as well as z1 and z2 to be associated with the variance of own and
neighboring RAC in the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009) approaches, we also borrow the
values of these variables from the observations chosen in steps 1 and 2.8
8For example, in the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach, the instruments used in the di￿erenced equation are market
proximity, population, tax e￿ort, and their corresponding spatial lags. Thus, as instruments in the di￿erenced equation that
now contains the simulated values of own and spatially lagged RAC we use the values of market proximity, population, tax
204. After simulating the values of own and neighboring RAC (and the corresponding values in x2, z1,
and z2), we apply each estimator to the data and compare the resulting estimates to the ‘true’ values
of zero.
OLS results are presented in Table 7, as well as for the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009) approaches.
Note, now OLS is the preferred estimator since the DGP eliminates the endogeneity issue. Table 8 contains
the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach results.
The results con￿rm the good performance of all four estimators in terms of bias. However, as in the
￿rst experimental design with entirely simulated data, the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach yields less
precise estimates than the other three estimators. Between the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009)
estimators, the Lewbel (2010) approach tends to outperform Klein and Vella (2009) approach in terms of
precision. As expected, OLS outperforms the Lewbel (2010) approach, producing RMSEs about one-third
to one-half the size.
In sum, both Monte Carlo experiments highlight the usefulness of all three identi￿cation strategies
employed in the current application when the identifying assumptions hold, as well as show how these
estimators can perform well even with multiple endogenous variables. Moreover, the simulations shed
some light on how to carefully interpret the ￿ndings in the current application. First, the simulations
point to the added variability of the estimates obtained using the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach in
small samples, as well as the modest improvement in precision with the Lewbel (2010) approach relative to
the Klein and Vella (2009) estimator in our data. That said, it is important to re-iterate that (i) our Monte
Carlo study is limited to a speci￿c simulated DGP as well as the data from our application and (ii) our
implementation of Klein and Vella’s (2009) estimator is based on a particular parametric implementation.
Certainly more detailed comparisons are required before making general statements regarding the relative
performance of the Lewbel (2010) and Klein and Vella (2009) approaches. Moreover, since each relies on
a di￿erent set of identifying assumptions, ‘ranking’ the two approaches is not meaningful unless both sets
of assumptions hold in a given data set. Nonetheless, the Monte Carlo results provide some additional
context with which to interpret the magnitudes obtained using the Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) approach
in the current application, as well as the larger standard errors when using the Klein and Vella (2009)
approach.
Second, the simulations in the empirical Monte Carlo study indicate that all three estimators yield much
e￿ort, and their corresponding spatial lags from the same observations used to obtain the simulated values of RAC and
neighboring RAC in steps 1 and 2. If we did not do this, the estimator would perform extremely poorly because the true
values of the instruments would fail to be correlated with the simulated endogenous regressors. Similar logic applies to the
other two estimation approaches.
21more precise estimates of the e￿ect of own environmental regulation relative to neighboring environmental
regulation. This is especially true when using the Crone regional weighting scheme. Thus, some caution
should be exhibited concluding that spatial e￿ects are unimportant in empirical models of the PHH (as
was already suggested by the large standard errors discussed previously).
4 Conclusion
The debate over the empirical validity of the PHH is heated and for good reason; the answer has far-reaching
consequences at the local, national, and international levels. To date, however, empirical assessments of the
PHH have been hampered by the lack of a credible identi￿cation strategy to overcome potential problems
associated with measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, the empirical literature on
the PHH has yet to adequately incorporate lessons from the literature on so-called third-country e￿ects.
Here, we propose three novel identi￿cation strategies couched within a model that incorporates spatial
e￿ects. A traditional Monte Carlo design, as well as an empirical Monte Carlo experiment, give us con￿-
dence in these approaches in the current context, one that includes two endogenous covariates. Together,
the three approaches shed new light on the role of environmental regulation in the determination of FDI
location.
Speci￿cally, using state-level panel data from 1977-1994 from the U.S., we consistently ￿nd (i) evidence
of environmental regulation being endogenous when examining the pollution-intensive chemical sector, (ii)
a negative and economically signi￿cant impact of own environmental stringency on inbound FDI in the
chemical sector, particularly when measured by employment, and (iii) signi￿cantly larger e￿ects of envi-
ronmental regulation on the chemical sector once endogeneity is addressed. The upward bias in standard
￿xed e￿ects estimates obtained under the assumption of strict exogeneity is consistent with attenuation
bias due to measurement error, as well as important unobservables positively correlated with environmen-
tal regulation and FDI in￿ows (such as tax breaks, investments in other public goods, or agglomeration
externalities).
While informative, continued research is warranted. First, the analysis here is at the regional level.
Before reaching important policy conclusions regarding such issues as the WTO’s justi￿cation to intervene
in the domestic environmental policy arena or the sensibility of linking international environmental and
trade agreements, further analysis is needed to determine the external validity of the ￿ndings obtained
here. Does environmental regulation have similar e￿ects at the country level? Despite this unknown, our
results do ￿rmly indicate that policymakers should worry about the incentives for local environmental
standards to deviate from Pareto-e￿cient levels. Such fears are particularly worrisome since prior evidence
22suggests that domestic investment may be even more sensitive to spatial variation in environmental policy
than foreign investment (e.g., List et al. 2004).
Second, the prior literature, while su￿ering from various de￿ciencies, has emphasized the heterogeneous
e￿ects of environmental regulation along numerous dimensions. For instance, Ederington et al. (2005) point
to substantial heterogeneity across source country (of imports) and the pollution intensity and geographic
mobility of the industrial sector. Dean et al. (2009) similarly document important heterogeneity by
source country (of foreign investment). Henderson and Millimet (2007) and Millimet and List (2004)
uncover heterogeneous e￿ects utilizing nonparametric and semiparametric methods, respectively. Some
of this heterogeneity is captured in this study; namely, di￿erential e￿ects by pollution intensity of the
manufacturing sector as well as by measure of FDI (PP&E versus employment). However, other dimensions
of heterogeneity uncovered by the prior literature cannot be addressed given the data and identi￿cation
strategies utilized here. Future research investigating whether the empirical evidence of heterogeneous
e￿ects continues to be present once measurement error, spatial e￿ects, and unobserved heterogeneity are
accounted for is needed for a deeper understanding of the linkages between environmental and trade policy.
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28A Data Appendix
The BEA regional classi￿cation is as follows.
1. New England: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut
2. Mideast: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland
3. Great Lakes: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin
4. Plains: Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas
5. Southeast: Georgia, Florida, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana
6. Southwest: Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico
7. Rocky Mountain: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah
8. Far West: Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada
The Crone (1998/1999) regions { based on a cluster analysis of similar economic activity { are as follows.
1. Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Arizona, Utah, Montana
2. Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Iowa, Delaware
3. Georgia, Florida, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama,
Mississippi, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Rhode Island
4. New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Connecticut, West Virginia, Vermont
5. Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Idaho, Nebraska, Texas, Wyoming, Minnesota, Louisiana,
Kansas
6. North Dakota, South Dakota, Colorado, New Mexico, Wisconsin
29Table A1.  Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
Total Manufacturing FDI (PP&E) 811 2859.31 3919.40 449 2796.21 3610.31 362 2937.57 4275.67
Chemical Sector FDI (PP&E) 563 1016.94 1732.51 323 812.53 1117.36 240 1292.04 2289.90
Non-Chemical Sector FDI (PP&E) 563 1491.44 1923.02 323 1440.59 1703.17 240 1559.88 2186.17
Total Manufacturing FDI (Employment) 814 32680.75 36602.64 452 37596.70 39038.80 362 26542.60 32329.69
Chemical Sector FDI (Employment) 621 7691.73 9641.22 349 8760.95 10820.55 272 6319.83 7677.71
Non-Chemical Sector FDI (Employment) 621 23377.44 26783.65 349 26047.92 26573.23 272 19950.99 26710.69
Relative Abatement Costs (RAC) 816 1.02 0.37 452 0.76 0.16 364 1.34 0.31
Unemployment Rate 816 6.61 2.09 452 6.14 1.87 364 7.20 2.21
Agricultural Land Values ($/per acre) 816 887.02 775.04 452 974.93 896.84 364 777.84 572.50
Energy Prices, Industrial Sector 816 5.51 1.70 452 5.89 1.85 364 5.04 1.35
Highway Road Mileage 816 80500.90 48367.55 452 82200.68 42205.87 364 78390.18 55056.13
Population (millions) 816 4.94 5.13 452 5.45 5.43 364 4.30 4.67
Unionization Rate 816 16.55 6.71 452 17.37 6.86 364 15.54 6.38
Average Production Worker Wages,  816 9.10 2.24 452 9.09 2.28 364 9.10 2.19
     Manufacturing Sector ($/hr)
Tax Effort 816 96.06 16.05 452 98.51 18.89 364 93.01 10.88
Market Proximity 816 6630.94 8220.03 452 8218.10 9694.03 364 4660.08 5283.64
RAC > 1 RAC ≤ 1 Full SampleB Estimation Algorithms
B.1 Lewbel (2010) Approach
Estimation of the empirical model
ln(FDIit) = Xit￿ + ￿ ln(RACit) + ￿ ln(
P
j2￿ !ijtRACjt) + "it
proceeds as follows:
1. Regress ln(RACit) on Xit and obtain b ￿1it
2. Regress ln(
P
j2￿ !ijtRACjt) on Xit and obtain b ￿2it
3. Form instruments e zrit ￿ (zrit ￿ z)b ￿rit, r = 1;2
4. Estimate the structural model via Limited Information Maximum Likelihood using e zrit, r = 1;2, as
instruments for ln(RACit) and ln(
P
j2￿ !ijtRACjt).
B.2 Klein & Vella (2009) Approach
Estimation of the empirical model
ln(FDIit) = Xit￿ + ￿ ln(RACit) + ￿ ln(
P






￿2it +e e "it
proceeds as follows:
1. Regress ln(RACit) on Xit and obtain b ￿1it
2. Regress ln(
P
j2￿ !ijtRACjt) on Xit and obtain b ￿2it
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b "it = ln(FDIit) ￿ Xitb ￿ ￿ b ￿ ln(RACit) ￿ b ￿ ln(
P
j2￿ !ijtRACjt);






306. Estimate via OLS:
ln(FDIit) = Xit￿ + ￿ ln(RACit) + ￿ ln(
P















7. Compute standard errors via bootstrap.
31Table 1.  Select Review of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis Literature with Endogenous Environmental Regulation.
Study Dependent Data Primary Measure of  Primary Instruments
Variable Environmental Regulation
Mulatu et al. (2010) Industry shares 13 countries and 16 ISIC industries 
averaged over 1990–1994
Environmental Sustainability Index in 
2001
Corruption in 1995; income in 1992; urbanization in 1997; 
schooling in 1990
Kellenberg (2009) Value added of majority owned U.S. 
multinational affiliates 
50 countries and nine industries over 
1999-2003
Two survey-based responses from 
executives concerning environmental 
stringency and consistency of 
enforcement
Own country: arable land/agricultural worker; 
tractors/agricultural worker.  Spatial lag of other countries in 
same region (weighted by GDP): land/agricultural worker; 
tractors/agricultural worker; public schools; capital/labor 
ratio; infrastructure; organized crime.
Cole and Fredriksson (2009) Inbound FDI stocks and flows divided by 
aggregate GDP
13 OECD and 20 developing countries 
over 1982-1992
Lead content of gasoline Total population
Levinson and Taylor (2008) U.S. net imports divided by the value of 
shipments
132 3-digit manufacturing sectors from 
Mexico and Canada over 1977-1986
PAOC per unit of value added The amount of a pollutant contributed by other sectors in the 
states in which the sector tends to locate (14 pollutants yields 
14 instruments); weighted average of state per capita 
incomes
Cole and Elliott (2005) U.S. outbound FDI stocks in Brazil and 
Mexico divided by total U.S. stocks in 
each country
31 (Brazil) or 36 (Mexico) 3-digit U.S. 
SIC industries over 1989-1994
PAOC per unit of value added Lagged PAOC per unit of value added over 1973-1978; 
industry-level pollution intensity in 1987
Cole et al. (2005) U.S. net exports as a share of value added 3-digit U.S. SIC industries over 1978-
1992, except 1979 and 1987
PAOC per unit of value added Follow Levinson and Taylor (2008); six types of air pollution 
yields six instruments
Jug and Mirza (2005) Imports as a share of domestic sales Nine 2-digit ISIC industries; 12 importing 
countries from the EU15 and 19 exporting 
countries from the EU15 and Central and 
Eastern Europe over 1996-1999
Environmental expenditures for total 
manufacturing
Total public expenditure; lagged investment in 
environmental equipment; lagged wages
Ederington et al. (2004) U.S. imports divided by the value of 
shipments
394 4-digit U.S. SIC industries fover 
1978-1994 except 1979 and 1987
PAOC per unit of total materials costs Similar to Levinson and Taylor (2008) based on geographic 
dispersion of industries
List et al. (2004) Number of manufacturing plant 
modifications and closures
New York State county-level data over 
1980-1990
Ozone attainment status Proportion of all contiguous western neighbors that are out of 
attainment
List et al. (2003) Number of new manufacturing plants New York State county-level data over 
1980-1990
Ozone attainment status Proportion of all contiguous western neighbors that are out of 
attainment
Fredriksson et al. (2003) U.S. state-level inbound FDI stocks across 
states
U.S. state-level panel data from four 
manufacturing sectors over 1977-1986
Levinson (2001) index of state-level 
relative PAOC
Per capita GSP and the share of legal services in GSP; non-
military government employment and the interaction between 
non-military government employment and share of legal 
services in GSP; corruption and its interaction with tax 
effort; corruption squared and its interaction with tax effort
Ederington and Minier (2003) U.S. net imports divided by the value of 
shipments
374 4-digit U.S. SIC industries over 1978-
1992, except 1979 and 1987
PAOC per unit of total materials costs Four-firm concentration ratio; number of firms; value of 
shipments; percentage of unionized workers; industry 
unemployment rates; lagged changes in import and export 
penetrations; recent industry growth; lagged total tradeTable 1 (cont.).  Select Review of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis Literature with Endogenous Environmental Regulation.
Study Dependent Data Primary Measure of  Primary Instruments
Variable Environmental Regulation
Cole and Elliott (2003) Net exports Four manufacturing sectors in 60 
countries from 1995
Index of environmental stringency from 
Eliste and Fredriksson (2004); proxy 
based on a change in energy intensity 
over 1980-1985 and level of energy 
intensity in 1980
Per capita income
Xing and Kolstad (2002) U.S. outbound FDI Six manfacturing sectors across 22 
countries from 1985 and 1990; data for 
some countries for both time points, in 
which case the average is used, and only 
from one of the years for the remainder
SO2 emissions Infant mortality rate; population density
Henderson (1997) Binary variable indicating whether an 
industry is located in a U.S. county or not
Five 3-digit U.S. SIC industries over 1978-
1987 for 742 urban counties
Ozone attainment status State fuel prices over 1978-1987; metro area manufacturing 
employment (except own industry) over 1978-1987; county 
and metro area total employment (except own industry) over 
1978-1987Table 2.  Determinants of Relative FDI: Pitt & Rosenzweig (1990) Approach.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Panel A.  Plant, Property, and Equipment
ln(RAC) -0.789* -4.720* -0.724* -4.657* -0.802* -3.437* -0.657* -3.535*
(0.155) (0.653) (0.146) (0.703) (0.142) (0.509) (0.151) (0.631)
ln(spatial RAC) -1.056* 0.930 0.596 0.977 0.148 7.210†
(0.349) (1.718) (0.498) (1.958) (0.576) (3.636)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 39.174 8.674 6.344 9.340
Overid Test 0.040 0.136 0.074 0.032
Endogeneity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563
Panel B.  Employment
ln(RAC) -0.498* -2.205* -0.447* -2.399* -0.494* -1.463* -0.584* -2.212*
(0.096) (0.304) (0.096) (0.339) (0.099) (0.308) (0.101) (0.346)
ln(spatial RAC) -0.758* 1.052 0.096 1.984† -0.546 2.421
(0.211) (0.869) (0.277) (0.929) (0.398) (1.903)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 38.003 13.256 10.666 10.037
Overid Test 0.834 0.210 0.172 0.164
Endogeneity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621
Spec (1) Spec (4) Spec (2) Spec (3)
Notes: ‡ p<0.10, † p<0.05, * p<0.01.  Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.  Dependent variable is chemical sector 
FDI minus all other manufacturing FDI.  RAC is relative abatement costs.  Other covariates included in Specification 1 
include: average production-worker wages, land prices, energy prices, total road mileage, unemployment rate, unionization 
rate, region dummies, and year dummies.  Specifications 2 - 4 also include spatial versions of these controls.  Specification 
2 uses contiguous weights; Specification 3 uses weights based on U.S. Census regions; Specification 4 uses weights based 
on Crone's (1998/1999) regions.  Excluded instruments are market proximity, population, and tax effort (Specifications 1 - 
4) and the spatial counterparts (Specifications 2 - 4).  Underid reports the p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk 
statistic with rejection implying identification; Overid reports the p-value of Hansen J statistic with rejection casting doubt 
on instruments' validity; Endog reports the p-value of endogeneity test of the endogenous regressors; Joint Sign. reports 
the p-value of Anderson-Rubin (1949) chi-square test of significance of the endogenous regressors; F-stat reports the 
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic for weak identification.  See text for further details.Table 3.  Determinants of Relative FDI: Pitt & Rosenzweig - Type Falsification Test.
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Panel A.  Plant, Property, and Equipment
ln(RAC) -0.509* 0.490 -0.346† -0.528 -0.294‡ 1.047* -0.573* 0.654
(0.153) (0.342) (0.151) (1.116) (0.156) (0.348) (0.166) (0.455)
ln(spatial RAC) 0.296 6.287 0.708 1.933 -0.313 1.306
(0.325) (5.431) (0.452) (1.814) (0.604) (2.045)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
F-stat 34.698 7.589 4.103 8.025
Overid Test 0.149 0.000 0.446 0.116
Endogeneity 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.011
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.001 0.079 0.052 0.000 0.016 0.008 0.002 0.119
N 469 469 469 469 469 469 469 469
Panel B.  Employment
ln(RAC) 0.156 0.099 0.069 -0.472 0.257† 0.642† 0.190 0.254
(0.117) (0.229) (0.113) (2.228) (0.116) (0.283) (0.130) (0.262)
ln(spatial RAC) 0.921* 7.805 1.071* 2.023† 0.752 2.050
(0.226) (8.739) (0.310) (0.980) (0.475) (1.350)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 34.627 10.226 9.067 10.627
Overid Test 0.525 0.000 0.000 0.358
Endogeneity 0.735 0.868 0.052 0.535
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.184 0.701 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.206 0.271
N 546 546 546 546 546 546 546 546
Notes: ‡ p<0.10, † p<0.05, * p<0.01. Dependent variable is FDI in the food and kindred products sector minus all other 
manufacturing FDI except the chemical sector.  See Table 2 for further details.  
Spec (1) Spec (2) Spec (3) Spec (4)Table 4.  Determinants of Chemical Sector FDI: OLS, Lewbel (2010), and Klein & Vella (2009) Approaches. 
OLS IV CF OLS IV CF OLS IV CF OLS IV CF
Panel A.  Plant, Property, and Equipment
ln(RAC) -0.198† -0.558* -0.812 -0.199† -0.474† -0.946 -0.153 -0.544* -0.826 -0.222† -0.477† -0.801
(0.092) (0.195) (0.577) (0.092) (0.200) (0.586) (0.095) (0.192) (0.639) (0.098) (0.235) (0.702)
ln(spatial RAC) -0.264 -1.100 1.482 -0.313 -1.178* -2.383 0.323 0.235 0.366
(0.169) (0.755) (1.379) (0.208) (0.430) (1.702) (0.310) (1.174) (1.383)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 41.951 7.000 17.955 5.977
Overid Test 0.814 0.000 0.550 0.236
Endogeneity 0.036 0.332 0.027 0.389
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.033 0.030 0.159 0.023 0.000 0.376 0.128 0.022 0.198 0.018 0.056 0.149
N 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563
Panel B.  Employment
ln(RAC) -0.397* -0.802* -0.669 -0.386* -0.719* -0.663 -0.291* -0.687* -0.498 -0.379* -0.886* -0.457
(0.072) (0.135) (0.588) (0.072) (0.133) (0.584) (0.071) (0.136) (0.595) (0.077) (0.168) (0.691)
ln(spatial RAC) -0.343† -0.645‡ -0.189 -0.273‡ -0.824* -0.790 0.270 -0.591 -1.198
(0.134) (0.343) (0.733) (0.153) (0.305) (0.705) (0.254) (0.783) (1.045)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 68.248 16.340 23.233 9.851
Overid Test 0.137 0.001 0.138 0.710
Endogeneity 0.000 0.020 0.003 0.001
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.000 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.566
N 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621 621
Spec (1) Spec (2) Spec (3) Spec (4)
Notes: ‡ p<0.10, † p<0.05, * p<0.01.  Standard errors are in parentheses; CF standard errors are obtained via bootstrap.  'IV' refers to the Lewbel (2010) approach estimated via 
Limited Information Maximum Likelihood; 'CF' refers to the Klein and Vella (2009) control function approach.  Other covariates included in Specification 1 include: average 
production-worker wages, land prices, energy prices, total road mileage, unemployment rate, unionization rate, market proximity, population, tax effort, state dummies, and year 
dummies.  Specifications 2 - 4 also include spatial versions of these controls.  Excluded instruments in the IV estimations are market proximity, population, and tax effort 
demeaned and interacted with the first-stage residuals (Specification 1) and the spatial counterparts (Specifications 2 - 4).  Underid reports the p-value of the Anderson (1951) 
canonical correlation test with rejection implying identification; Overid reports the p-value of Anderson-Rubin (1950) statistic with rejection casting doubt on instruments' 
validity; Endog reports the p-value of endogeneity test of the endogenous regressors; Joint Sign. reports the p-value of Anderson-Rubin chi-square test of endogenous regressors; 
F-stat reports the Cragg and Donald (1993) F statistic for weak identification.  See Table 2 for further details.   Table 5.  Determinants of Total Manufacturing FDI: OLS, Lewbel (2010), and Klein & Vella (2009) Approaches. 
OLS IV CF OLS IV CF OLS IV CF OLS IV CF
Panel A.  Plant, Property, and Equipment
ln(RAC) -0.079‡ -0.155† -0.369 -0.082‡ -0.285* -0.472 -0.011 -0.021 -0.115 -0.086‡ -0.110 -0.251
(0.046) (0.073) (0.466) (0.047) (0.087) (0.356) (0.046) (0.074) (0.425) (0.048) (0.083) (0.342)
ln(spatial RAC) -0.126 -1.166* -0.902 -0.094 -0.198 0.577 0.181 0.690 -0.266
(0.096) (0.287) (1.021) (0.100) (0.201) (0.548) (0.159) (0.471) (0.935)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 137.812 15.194 34.614 14.245
Overid Test 0.758 0.363 0.082 0.814
Endogeneity 0.195 0.000 0.846 0.257
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.086 0.168 0.428 0.089 0.000 0.740 0.638 0.154 0.555 0.057 0.161 0.792
N 811 811 811 811 811 811 811 811 811 811 811 811
Panel B.  Employment
ln(RAC) -0.013 0.042 0.042 -0.027 0.019 -0.034 0.053 0.167* 0.489 -0.042 -0.008 0.160
(0.041) (0.065) (0.411) (0.041) (0.068) (0.553) (0.040) (0.063) (0.475) (0.043) (0.072) (0.401)
ln(spatial RAC) 0.039 -0.099 -0.310 -0.023 0.005 0.323 0.201 -0.027 -0.654
(0.086) (0.229) (0.475) (0.089) (0.173) (0.380) (0.144) (0.418) (0.609)
Underid Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat 147.699 17.159 37.330 14.560
Overid Test 0.714 0.165 0.437 0.918
Endogeneity 0.283 0.354 0.067 0.474
Joint Sign. Endog. 0.754 0.778 0.919 0.731 0.325 0.382 0.396 0.080 0.389 0.158 0.987 0.432
N 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 814
Spec (1) Spec (2) Spec (3) Spec (4)
Notes: ‡ p<0.10, † p<0.05, * p<0.01.  See Table 4 for further details.Table 6.  Monte Carlo Results.
OLS PR - IV Lewbel - IV CF Traditional OLS PR - IV Lewbel - IV CF Traditional
IV IV
Coeff on Endogenous
   Regressor #1
     Bias 0.394 -0.008 -0.003 -0.025 -0.002 0.396 0.007 -0.003 -0.006 0.007
     Mean Absolute Error 0.394 0.100 0.033 0.051 0.070 0.396 0.042 0.014 0.022 0.025
     Root MSE 0.396 0.125 0.043 0.067 0.089 0.396 0.053 0.017 0.027 0.030
Coeff on Endogenous
   Regressor #2
     Bias -0.521 -0.005 0.003 0.030 -0.004 -0.522 0.006 0.002 0.010 -0.005
     Mean Absolute Error 0.521 0.099 0.035 0.058 0.070 0.522 0.042 0.013 0.024 0.028
     Root MSE 0.522 0.125 0.045 0.076 0.089 0.522 0.053 0.017 0.030 0.034
N = 5000 N = 750
Notes:  1000 simulations used when N = 750; 100 simulations used when N = 5000.  OLS = Ordinary Least Squares; PR-IV = Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) 
IV estimator; Lewbel-IV = Lewbel (2010) IV estimator; CF = Klein and Vella (2009) control function estimator; Traditional-IV = IV estimator based on 
usual exclusion restrictions.  MSE = Mean Squared Error.  See text for further details.Table 7.  Empirical Monte Carlo Results: Lewbel (2010) and Klein & Vella (2009) Approaches.
OLS Lewbel - IV CF OLS Lewbel - IV CF OLS Lewbel - IV CF
I.  PP&E: Chemical Sector
   ln(RAC)
     Bias 0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.008 0.003 0.000 -0.010
     MAE 0.039 0.071 0.110 0.036 0.081 0.111 0.043 0.078 0.103
     Root MSE 0.051 0.094 0.145 0.048 0.105 0.144 0.054 0.101 0.133
   ln(spatial RAC)
     Bias 0.000 0.018 0.016 0.002 0.021 0.032 0.001 -0.004 0.018
     MAE 0.060 0.168 0.236 0.051 0.096 0.158 0.117 0.344 0.379
     Root MSE 0.076 0.208 0.292 0.073 0.126 0.206 0.147 0.445 0.505
II.  PP&E: Total Manufacturing
   ln(RAC)
     Bias -0.005 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.007 -0.004 0.000 0.006
     MAE 0.023 0.036 0.049 0.019 0.033 0.051 0.022 0.039 0.046
     Root MSE 0.028 0.044 0.062 0.024 0.043 0.064 0.027 0.048 0.057
   ln(spatial RAC)
     Bias 0.003 -0.019 -0.023 -0.011 -0.018 -0.008 -0.004 0.009 -0.009
     MAE 0.040 0.109 0.130 0.034 0.060 0.083 0.065 0.204 0.221
     Root MSE 0.047 0.134 0.155 0.044 0.076 0.107 0.084 0.258 0.285
III.  Employment: Chemical Sector
   ln(RAC)
     Bias -0.006 -0.006 0.006 -0.005 -0.018 -0.019 0.004 0.008 -0.007
     MAE 0.028 0.048 0.066 0.024 0.057 0.079 0.032 0.064 0.085
     Root MSE 0.041 0.065 0.083 0.036 0.078 0.108 0.044 0.082 0.112
   ln(spatial RAC)
     Bias 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.014 -0.010 0.041 0.050
     MAE 0.049 0.137 0.143 0.046 0.093 0.138 0.110 0.337 0.286
     Root MSE 0.065 0.186 0.197 0.065 0.122 0.185 0.142 0.413 0.370
IV.  Employment: Total Manufacturing
   ln(RAC)
     Bias 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.006
     MAE 0.031 0.049 0.015 0.038 0.046 0.019 0.035 0.043 0.021
     Root MSE 0.048 0.069 0.029 0.056 0.068 0.032 0.054 0.063 0.035
   ln(spatial RAC)
     Bias -0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.014 -0.004
     MAE 0.090 0.085 0.030 0.057 0.087 0.036 0.203 0.197 0.067
     Root MSE 0.124 0.125 0.047 0.081 0.119 0.051 0.254 0.259 0.094
Notes:  100 simulations used, where ln(RAC) and ln(spatial RAC) are replaced by random draws from the empirical distribution of 
each variable.  RAC is relative abatement costs.  Specification 2 uses contiguous weights; Specification 3 uses weights based on 
U.S. Census regions; Specification 4 uses weights based on Crone's (1998/1999) regions.  MAE = Mean Absolute Error; MSE = 
Mean Squared Error.  See text and Table 6 for further details.
Spec (4) Spec (3) Spec (2)Table 8.  Empirical Monte Carlo Results: Pitt & Rosenzweig (1990) Approach.
I.  PP&E
   ln(RAC)
     Bias
     MAE
     Root MSE
   ln(spatial RAC)
     Bias
     MAE
     Root MSE
II.  Employment
   ln(RAC)
     Bias
     MAE
     Root MSE
   ln(spatial RAC)
     Bias
     MAE














Notes:  100 simulations used, where ln(RAC) and ln(spatial RAC) are replaced by random 
draws from the empirical distribution of each variable.  Dependent variable is chemical 
sector FDI minus all other manufacturing FDI.  MAE = Mean Absolute Error; MSE = Mean 


















Spec (2) Spec (3) Spec (4)
0.054
0.171